Landmark Constitutional Judgments — Basic Structure, PIL, Privacy & Key SC Verdicts

Introduction

The Supreme Court of India has, through landmark judgments delivered over seven decades, shaped the living character of the Constitution. From defining the limits of parliamentary power to expanding the scope of fundamental rights, these verdicts form the backbone of Indian constitutional jurisprudence. A thorough understanding of these cases is indispensable for UPSC aspirants — they appear across Prelims, Mains GS-II, and Essay papers.

This chapter covers the most significant constitutional judgments in chronological order, organized thematically around the amendment power debate, fundamental rights expansion, federalism, social justice, and individual liberty.

Part I — The Amendment Power Debate

1. Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India (1951)

The petitioner, a zamindar from Bihar, challenged the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, which curtailed the right to property under Articles 19(1)(f) and 31. The Supreme Court upheld the First Amendment, ruling that the word "law" in Article 13(2) refers to ordinary legislative law and does not include constitutional amendments made under Article 368. Therefore, Parliament possessed unlimited power to amend the Constitution, including Fundamental Rights.

Significance: Established the principle that constitutional amendments are exercises of constituent power, distinct from ordinary legislative power, and are therefore immune from the restrictions of Article 13.

2. Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967)

The Golaknath family from Jalandhar, Punjab, held over 500 acres of farmland. Under the Punjab Security and Land Tenures Act, 1953, the state declared most of their land "surplus." They challenged this law as violating their fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19(1)(f), and 19(1)(g).

By a narrow 6:5 majority, the Supreme Court reversed Shankari Prasad and held that a constitutional amendment under Article 368 is "law" within the meaning of Article 13. Consequently, Parliament could not amend Fundamental Rights. The Court applied the doctrine of "prospective overruling" — meaning the decision would apply only to future amendments, not to amendments already enacted.

Significance: This judgment directly led to the 24th Amendment Act, 1971, which expressly declared that Parliament has the power to amend any provision of the Constitution, including Fundamental Rights, and that Article 13 does not apply to amendments under Article 368.

3. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) — The Basic Structure Doctrine

Sri Kesavananda Bharati, head of the Edneer Mutt in Kerala, challenged the constitutional validity of the 24th, 25th, and 29th Amendments, which had been enacted to override the Golaknath decision and curtail judicial review of land reform legislation.

The thirteen-judge Bench comprised Chief Justice S.M. Sikri, and Justices J.M. Shelat, K.S. Hegde, A.N. Grover, A.N. Ray, P. Jaganmohan Reddy, D.G. Palekar, H.R. Khanna, K.K. Mathew, M.H. Beg, S.N. Dwivedi, A.K. Mukherjea, and Y.V. Chandrachud.

By a historic 7:6 majority, the Court held that:

• Parliament has wide powers to amend the Constitution under Article 368, including Fundamental Rights (overruling Golaknath).
• However, Parliament cannot alter the "basic structure" or "basic features" of the Constitution.
• Judicial review is itself part of the basic structure.

Elements of Basic Structure identified (across various judgments):

• Supremacy of the Constitution
• Republican and democratic form of government
• Secular character of the Constitution
• Separation of powers among legislature, executive, and judiciary
• Federal character of the Constitution
• Unity and sovereignty of India
• Individual freedom and dignity
• Principle of equality
• Judicial review (Articles 32 and 226)
• Rule of law
• Harmony between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles
• Free and fair elections
• Limited power of Parliament to amend the Constitution
• Effective access to justice
• Parliamentary system of government

Significance: The Basic Structure Doctrine is the single most important constitutional principle in India. It places an ultimate check on parliamentary power — even a constitutional amendment can be struck down if it violates the basic structure. No subsequent judgment has overruled this doctrine.

4. Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980)

During the Emergency, the 42nd Amendment Act, 1976 made two critical changes: (a) Section 4 amended Article 31C to give Directive Principles primacy over all Fundamental Rights (not just Articles 14 and 19); (b) Section 55 inserted clauses (4) and (5) in Article 368, declaring that no constitutional amendment could be questioned in any court on any ground.

By a 4:1 majority (Justice P.N. Bhagwati dissenting), the Court struck down both provisions as violating the basic structure of the Constitution.

Key observations:

• The Constitution is founded on a balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles — giving absolute primacy to either would destroy the basic structure.
• If Parliament's amending power is made unlimited, the Constitution ceases to be supreme; Parliament becomes supreme — which is antithetical to a written constitution.
• Judicial review of constitutional amendments is part of the basic structure and cannot be taken away.

Significance: Reinforced and strengthened the Basic Structure Doctrine by establishing that the limited nature of the amending power is itself a basic feature.

Part II — Fundamental Rights Expansion

5. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) — Due Process and the Golden Triangle

Maneka Gandhi's passport was impounded on 2 July 1977 by the Regional Passport Officer under Section 10(3)(c) of the Passports Act, 1967, on grounds of "public interest." No reasons were provided despite her request.

The Supreme Court transformed the interpretation of Article 21, holding that:

• The "procedure established by law" must be just, fair, and reasonable — not arbitrary, fanciful, or oppressive.
• Articles 14, 19, and 21 are not mutually exclusive but form an interconnected "golden triangle" — any law depriving personal liberty must satisfy all three.
• The Court effectively read the American "due process" standard into Article 21 without formally amending the text.
• Overruled the narrow reading of Article 21 in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950), which had treated Fundamental Rights as watertight compartments.

Significance: Maneka Gandhi is the single most important judgment for expanding the scope of Article 21. Every subsequent expansion of the right to life — right to livelihood, right to education, right to health, right to shelter, right to a clean environment, right to privacy — traces its origin to this verdict.

6. ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (1976) — The Habeas Corpus Case

During the Emergency (1975-77), several political detainees challenged their detention under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA). The question was whether the right to move courts under Article 21 could be suspended during an Emergency.

By a 4:1 majority, the Court ruled in favor of the government, holding that no person has any locus standi to move any writ petition under Article 226 before a High Court for habeas corpus or any other writ to challenge the legality of a detention order during an Emergency when Article 21 has been suspended.

Justice H.R. Khanna's lone dissent — He held that the right to life and personal liberty exists independent of Article 21 and cannot be taken away even during an Emergency. His dissent cost him the Chief Justiceship — Justice M.H. Beg was appointed instead, superseding Khanna.

Overruling in 2017: In K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017), the nine-judge Bench unanimously held that ADM Jabalpur was "seriously flawed" and expressly overruled it. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud observed that Justice Khanna's dissent represented the correct constitutional position.

Significance: ADM Jabalpur is widely regarded as the darkest hour of the Indian judiciary. Its overruling in 2017 restored the principle that fundamental rights, especially the right to life, are non-derogable even during emergencies.

7. K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) — Right to Privacy

The case arose from challenges to the Aadhaar scheme. The government argued that no fundamental right to privacy existed, relying on M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra (1954, eight-judge Bench) and Kharak Singh v. State of UP (1962, six-judge Bench).

The nine-judge Bench comprised Chief Justice J.S. Khehar, and Justices J. Chelameswar, S.A. Bobde, R.K. Agrawal, Rohinton F. Nariman, A.M. Sapre, D.Y. Chandrachud, S.K. Kaul, and S. Abdul Nazeer.

The Bench unanimously held that:

• The right to privacy is a constitutionally protected fundamental right, intrinsic to life and personal liberty under Article 21, and as part of the freedoms guaranteed by Part III.
• M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh were overruled to the extent they held otherwise.
• ADM Jabalpur was expressly overruled.
• Privacy includes informational privacy, decisional autonomy, and bodily integrity.
• The right is not absolute and is subject to reasonable restrictions based on a three-part test: legality, legitimate aim, and proportionality.

Significance: One of the most consequential judgments in Indian constitutional history. It laid the groundwork for subsequent decisions on Aadhaar (2018), Section 377 (Navtej Johar, 2018), adultery (Joseph Shine, 2018), and the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023.

Part III — Social Justice and Equality

8. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992) — The Mandal Case

Following Prime Minister V.P. Singh's 1990 announcement implementing the Mandal Commission's recommendation of 27% reservation for OBCs in central government jobs, widespread protests erupted. Indra Sawhney and others challenged the government notification.

Key holdings:

• 50% ceiling: Total reservations (SC + ST + OBC) must not exceed 50% under ordinary circumstances. Extraordinary situations in remote and far-flung areas may warrant exceptions.
• Creamy layer exclusion: The economically and socially advanced sections within OBCs (the "creamy layer") must be excluded from reservation benefits. This concept applies to OBCs but not to SCs and STs.
• No reservations in promotions: Article 16(4) permits reservations only at the point of entry (initial appointment), not in promotions. (This holding was later modified by the 77th, 81st, 82nd, and 85th Amendment Acts.)
• Backwardness criteria: Caste can be a starting point but not the sole criterion for determining backwardness; social, educational, and economic factors must also be considered.
• No reservation in certain posts: Reservations should not apply to technical, superspeciality, and research positions where merit is paramount.

Significance: The Mandal judgment remains the foundational ruling on reservation policy in India. The 50% ceiling and creamy layer concept are still cited in every subsequent reservation-related case.

9. Vishakha v. State of Rajasthan (1997) — Sexual Harassment Guidelines

The case was triggered by the gang rape of Bhanwari Devi, a social worker (saathin) in Rajasthan, who was targeted for trying to prevent a child marriage. When the Rajasthan High Court acquitted the accused, women's groups including Vishakha filed a PIL.

In the absence of any legislative framework, the Supreme Court invoked Articles 14, 19(1)(g), and 21, read with CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women), to lay down the Vishakha Guidelines:

• Defined sexual harassment to include unwelcome physical contact, demand for sexual favours, sexually coloured remarks, showing pornography, and any unwelcome physical, verbal, or non-verbal conduct of a sexual nature.
• Made it mandatory for every employer to establish a Complaints Committee headed by a woman.
• Required employers to take preventive steps and awareness measures.

These guidelines were binding law until replaced by the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (PoSH Act).

Significance: Demonstrated the Supreme Court's power to fill legislative vacuums through judicial creativity. Also a key example of the domestic application of international conventions (CEDAW) by Indian courts.

Part IV — Federalism and Governance

10. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) — President's Rule and Federalism

The case originated when the Janata Dal government in Karnataka under S.R. Bommai was dismissed in 1989 after defections, without a floor test. Several other state governments had also been dismissed on similar grounds.

Key holdings:

• Judicial review of Article 356: Proclamations under Article 356 are subject to judicial review. The President's satisfaction must be based on relevant material and not on extraneous or irrelevant grounds.
• Floor test is mandatory: The Governor cannot subjectively assess whether a government has lost majority. The only valid method of determining majority is through a floor test in the Legislative Assembly.
• Secularism is basic structure: The Court held that secularism is a basic feature of the Constitution and that any state government acting against secular principles may be dismissed under Article 356.
• Dissolved assemblies can be revived: If the imposition of President's Rule is held unconstitutional, the dissolved state assembly can be restored.
• Parliamentary approval is a check: The proclamation must be approved by both Houses of Parliament within two months, and Parliament can refuse to approve it.

Significance: S.R. Bommai effectively curbed the political misuse of Article 356, which had been invoked over 100 times before 1994, often for partisan purposes. After this judgment, the frequency of Article 356 imposition decreased significantly.

11. Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2015) — The NJAC Case (Fourth Judges Case)

The Constitution (Ninety-Ninth Amendment) Act, 2014, and the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) Act, 2014, replaced the collegium system of judicial appointments with a six-member NJAC comprising the CJI, two senior-most SC judges, the Law Minister, and two eminent persons nominated by a committee of the PM, CJI, and Leader of Opposition.

By a 4:1 majority (Justice J. Chelameswar dissenting), the Court struck down both the 99th Amendment and the NJAC Act as unconstitutional, holding that they violated the basic structure of the Constitution by compromising judicial independence.

Key observations:

• Independence of the judiciary is a basic feature of the Constitution.
• The inclusion of the executive in judicial appointments would undermine the principle of separation of powers.
• However, the Court acknowledged the need for reforms in the collegium system and directed that a new Memorandum of Procedure be framed to improve transparency.

Significance: Reaffirmed the primacy of the judiciary in judicial appointments while also acknowledging that the collegium system needs reform — a debate that continues.

Part V — Individual Liberty and Social Change

12. TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002) — Minority Education Rights

Key holdings:

• The right under Article 30(1) is not absolute but subject to reasonable regulations by the State.
• Minority status is to be determined at the state level, not the national level.
• Unaided minority institutions have autonomy in admissions and fee structure, provided the process is transparent, fair, and merit-based.
• Aided minority institutions are subject to Article 29(2) — they cannot completely deny admission to non-minority students but may give reasonable preference to minority students.
• Both aided and unaided institutions are subject to regulatory measures to ensure educational standards.

Significance: Provided the definitive framework for balancing minority educational rights with regulatory oversight, shaping subsequent legislation including the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (and the exemption of minority institutions from its ambit).

13. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) — Decriminalization of Section 377

The petitioners — dancer Navtej Singh Johar, journalist Sunil Mehra, chef Ritu Dalmia, hoteliers Aman Nath and Keshav Suri, and businesswoman Ayesha Kapur — argued that Section 377 violated their fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21.

The Court unanimously read down Section 377 to exclude consensual sexual acts between adults from its ambit, holding the provision unconstitutional to that extent. This overruled Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation (2013), which had restored the criminalization of homosexuality.

Key observations:

• CJ Misra: "Criminalising carnal intercourse is irrational, arbitrary and manifestly unconstitutional."
• Justice Chandrachud: Sexual orientation is an intrinsic element of personal liberty, dignity, and privacy.
• Justice Malhotra: "History owes an apology to the members of this community and their families."
• The non-consensual aspects of Section 377 (minors, non-consensual acts, bestiality) remain in force.

Significance: A watershed moment for LGBTQ+ rights in India. Built upon the Puttaswamy right to privacy framework to recognize sexual orientation as a constitutionally protected facet of identity.

14. Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2018) — The Sabarimala Case

By a 4:1 majority (Justice Indu Malhotra dissenting), the Court struck down Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965, which permitted the exclusion of women based on custom.

Key holdings:

• The exclusion of menstruating women cannot be an "essential religious practice" of Hinduism.
• Constitutional morality must prevail over popular morality or traditional custom.
• Devotion cannot be subjected to gender discrimination.
• Justice Malhotra (dissent): Courts should not interfere with the essential religious practices of a denomination; issues of deep religious sentiment should be left to the religious community.

Note (as of May 2026): In November 2019, a five-judge Bench referred several questions arising from the Sabarimala case — including the scope of "essential religious practice", the relationship between Articles 25 and 26, and the limits of constitutional morality — to a larger Bench. The reference came up before a nine-judge Constitution Bench led by CJI Surya Kant; hearings commenced on 7 April 2026 and after 16 days of arguments the Bench reserved verdict on 14 May 2026. The forthcoming judgment is expected to affect not just Sabarimala but Dawoodi Bohra female circumcision, Parsi entry into fire temples, and the wider doctrine of essential religious practices.

15. Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2018) — Adultery Decriminalized

Joseph Shine, a non-resident Keralite, challenged Section 497 IPC, which criminalized adultery but punished only the man — the married woman was treated as a victim, not an offender.

The Court unanimously struck down Section 497 as unconstitutional, violating Articles 14, 15, and 21.

Key observations:

• Section 497 was based on outdated patriarchal notions treating women as the property of their husbands.
• The provision denied women sexual autonomy and agency.
• Adultery may remain a ground for divorce under civil law but cannot be a criminal offence.
• Justice Chandrachud: "The husband is not the master of the wife."

Significance: Decriminalized a 158-year-old colonial-era law and reinforced the constitutional principles of gender equality and individual autonomy.

16. In Re: Article 370 of the Constitution (2023) — Abrogation Upheld

The Constitution Bench comprised Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Sanjiv Khanna, B.R. Gavai and Surya Kant. The bench unanimously upheld the constitutional validity of Presidential Orders C.O. 272 and C.O. 273 (dated 5 and 6 August 2019), which had amended Article 367 and abrogated Articles 370 and 35A.

Key holdings:

• Article 370 was a temporary provision, both textually and historically — its avowed goal was the eventual constitutional integration of J&K into India.
• The dissolution of the J&K Constituent Assembly in 1957 did not freeze Article 370 in place — the President retained the power under Article 370(3) to declare that Article 370 ceased to be operative.
• State Government concurrence was not a constitutional pre-condition once the J&K Constituent Assembly had dissolved; the Governor's (and later Lieutenant Governor's) concurrence sufficed.
• The bench declined to examine the validity of the reorganisation of J&K into two Union Territories as Solicitor General Tushar Mehta had assured statehood would be restored — though the bench directed restoration of J&K's statehood at the earliest and Elections to the J&K Legislative Assembly to be held by 30 September 2024 (which were duly held; Omar Abdullah took oath as CM on 16 October 2024).
• The bench established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission-style body to investigate human-rights violations in J&K by both state and non-state actors over the previous decades (Justice Kaul's separate concurrence).

Significance: The first authoritative judicial determination on the legal mechanics of Article 370's abrogation. The judgment validates the executive-legislative process used in August 2019 while leaving open the constitutional propriety of converting a State to two Union Territories.

UPSC angle: Prelims — In Re Article 370 (11 December 2023); five-judge unanimous Constitution Bench; upheld Presidential Orders C.O. 272 & 273; Justice Kaul's TRC recommendation. Mains [2016 — Article 370 temporariness and future prospects] — examine how the abrogation of Article 370 and the SC's 2023 verdict reshape Indian federalism and the constitutional position of Jammu & Kashmir.

17. Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India (2024) — Electoral Bonds

The Court unanimously struck down the Electoral Bond Scheme as unconstitutional, holding that it violated the voters' fundamental right to information under Article 19(1)(a).

Key holdings:

• The right to information about political funding is a constitutionally protected right of voters.
• Anonymous electoral bonds infringed on the voters' right to know who funds which political party.
• The Court also struck down related amendments to Section 182 of the Companies Act, 2013 (which had removed the cap on corporate donations), the Income Tax Act, and the Representation of the People Act.
• SBI was directed to submit all details of electoral bonds purchased from 12 April 2019 to the Election Commission, which published the full data on 21 March 2024.

Significance: One of the most consequential judgments on electoral transparency. Reasserted voters' right to information as a pre-decisional right essential to democratic participation.

18. I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007) — Ninth Schedule and Basic Structure

A nine-judge Bench led by Chief Justice Y.K. Sabharwal unanimously held that any law placed in the Ninth Schedule after 24 April 1973 (the date of Kesavananda Bharati) is open to challenge if it abridges or abrogates the basic structure of the Constitution, including the "essence" of Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19 and 21. The blanket immunity of Article 31B is therefore subject to the Basic Structure Doctrine.

Key holdings:

• The Ninth Schedule cannot be a "constitutional dustbin" insulating laws from scrutiny.
• Validity is to be tested by applying the "rights test" (does the law impair the essence of a Fundamental Right?) and the "essence test" (does it damage the basic structure?), per M. Nagaraj v. Union of India (2006).
• Pre-1973 Ninth Schedule laws retain immunity; post-1973 entries are reviewable.

Significance: Closed the post-Kesavananda loophole through which successive governments had attempted to immunise controversial laws (especially reservation and land-reform legislation) from judicial review by placing them in the Ninth Schedule. Reaffirmed that judicial review itself is part of the basic structure.

UPSC angle: Prelims — I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (11 January 2007); nine-judge unanimous bench; Ninth Schedule laws inserted post-24 April 1973 are open to basic-structure challenge; "rights test" + "essence test". Mains [2016 — Coelho case and judicial review as basic feature] — discuss how the Coelho judgment operationalises Kesavananda in relation to the Ninth Schedule, and its implications for reservation and land-reform laws.

Consolidated Table of Landmark Judgments

Cross-paper relevance

• GS2 — Polity (primary) — Basic Structure doctrine, judicial review, PIL, Right to Privacy, LGBTQ rights, electoral bonds; landmark judgments across constitutional themes
• GS2 — Governance — Judicial accountability (NJAC judgment 2015), collegium system, contempt of court, separation of powers; court as accountability mechanism
• GS4 — Ethics — Judicial ethics: dissenting opinions, conscience vs. precedent; landmark cases on dignity (Navtej Johar, Puttaswamy) and their moral philosophy underpinning
• Essay — Recurring theme: "The Supreme Court as the guardian of the Constitution" (2020); "Judicial activism: boon or bane for democracy?" (2019)

Recent Developments (2024–2026)

The Electoral Bonds ruling (Case #18 above) is the gateway to this period. The cases below are the major post-2024 additions; together they account for most of the new constitutional-law landscape since the previous CJI-Chandrachud era.

Supriyo @ Supriya Chakraborty v. Union of India (17 October 2023) — Same-Sex Marriage

The five-judge bench was constituted to hear petitions seeking recognition of same-sex marriages under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 and other existing personal laws. The petitioners relied on Navtej Singh Johar (2018) and the right to privacy (Puttaswamy, 2017) to argue for a fundamental right to marry a person of one's choice regardless of gender.

Key holdings (majority — Bhat, Kohli, Narasimha):

• There is no fundamental right to marry under the Constitution — marriage is a statutory creation, not a constitutional one
• Parliament, not the Court, is the appropriate forum to legislate on same-sex marriage recognition
• The 1954 Special Marriage Act cannot be read to include same-sex couples; that would require rewriting the statute
• Unmarried queer couples have no right to jointly adopt children under the existing adoption framework

Key holdings (minority — CJI Chandrachud + Justice Kaul):

• The State must recognise civil unions for same-sex couples through legislation
• Denial of union rights violates Article 15 (discrimination based on sexual orientation)

Unanimous holdings (all 5 judges):

• Same-sex couples have the right to cohabit without discrimination under Articles 19(1)(a) and 21
• Police and State authorities cannot harass or discriminate against LGBTQ+ persons
• Centre and States directed to take steps to protect LGBTQ+ rights in everyday public life

UPSC angle: Prelims — Supriyo @ Supriya Chakraborty v. Union of India (17 October 2023); five-judge bench; 3:2 split; no fundamental right to marry; Special Marriage Act cannot be read to include same-sex couples; right to cohabit unanimously recognised; CJI Chandrachud's dissent sought civil union recognition. Mains GS2 — "Examine the constitutional arguments for and against recognising same-sex marriages in India. How does the Supriyo judgment locate the question within the separation of powers framework?"

Property Owners' Association v. State of Maharashtra (2024) — Article 39(b) and Private Property

A nine-judge Constitution Bench ruled on 5 November 2024, by an 8:1 majority (one judge writing a partial dissent), on the scope of Article 39(b) — the DPSP directing distribution of "material resources of the community." Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud authored the majority opinion for himself and six other judges (Justices Hrishikesh Roy, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Rajesh Bindal, Satish C. Sharma and Augustine G. Masih), overruling the sweeping interpretation in Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer's Ranganatha Reddy (1977) minority view (which had been adopted by the majority in Sanjeev Coke (1983)). The majority held that not every privately owned resource automatically qualifies as a "material resource of the community"; whether a private resource so qualifies depends on the nature of the resource, its scarcity, the consequences of its concentration, and its impact on community welfare.

Justice B.V. Nagarathna wrote a partially dissenting opinion (not a concurrence) — she agreed that the Ranganatha Reddy minority view was too sweeping but criticised the majority's framing as unduly narrow and disrespectful to Justice Krishna Iyer's contribution. Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia wrote a complete dissent, arguing that Parliament's distributive prerogative under Article 39(b) is broad and that judicial second-guessing of "material resource" classifications is an overreach.

The Court also unanimously upheld Article 31C in its post-Minerva Mills (1980) form — protecting only laws implementing Articles 39(b) and 39(c) from challenge under Articles 14 and 19.

UPSC angle: Prelims — Property Owners' Association v. State of Maharashtra (5 November 2024); nine-judge bench; 8:1 (with Nagarathna partial dissent + Dhulia full dissent); Article 39(b); overruled the Ranganatha Reddy (1977) Krishna Iyer minority view as adopted in Sanjeev Coke (1983); Article 31C survives in its post-Minerva Mills form. Mains [2019 — Basic Structure & Article 368 limits] — connect to the FR–DPSP tension in the context of property rights and welfare-state obligations.

Mineral Area Development Authority v. M/S Steel Authority of India (25 July 2024) — States' Mineral Tax Power

A nine-judge Constitution Bench (8:1 majority) held that states have the power to levy tax on mines and mineral-bearing land under Entry 50 of State List VII. Royalty under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 is not a tax — overruling India Cement Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu (1990). The majority opinion was authored by Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud; Justice B.V. Nagarathna dissented.

On 14 August 2024, the majority bench clarified prospectively-retrospectively: states can recover the tax for the period from 1 April 2005 onwards, in staggered instalments over 12 years beginning 1 April 2026; no interest or penalties on the back-tax. This protects fiscal-federal claims while shielding industry from one-time shocks.

UPSC angle: Prelims — Mineral Area Development Authority v. M/S Steel Authority of India (25 July 2024); nine-judge bench; 8:1 (Nagarathna sole dissent); royalty ≠ tax; states can levy tax on mines & mineral-bearing land under Entry 50 List II; retrospective from 1 April 2005, staggered over 12 years from 1 April 2026. Mains [2019 — Basic Structure & Article 368] — analyse the fiscal federalism implications: which mineral-rich states (Jharkhand, Odisha, Chhattisgarh, West Bengal) benefit, and how does this interact with the 16th Finance Commission's horizontal devolution framework?

Sita Soren v. Union of India (4 March 2024) — Bribery and Parliamentary Privilege

A seven-judge Constitution Bench, in its judgment dated 4 March 2024, unanimously held that legislators are not protected by parliamentary privilege (Articles 105/194) when they accept bribes to vote in Parliament. The Court overruled P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (1998, five-judge bench, 3:2), which had controversially protected bribed legislators on the ground that their speech/vote in the House was covered by privilege. The ruling marks a significant anti-corruption expansion of constitutional jurisprudence — a bribe is a criminal act antecedent to the vote and therefore falls outside the shield of Art 105/194.

UPSC angle: Prelims — Sita Soren v. Union of India (4 March 2024); seven-judge bench; bribery not protected by privilege; overruled PV Narasimha Rao (1998, 3:2). Mains — analyse how the Sita Soren judgment reshapes the relationship between parliamentary privilege, constitutional morality, and the anti-corruption framework; discuss the significance of a 7-judge bench overruling a prior 5-judge decision.

Tribunal Reforms Act Struck Down — Two-Judge Division Bench (19 November 2025)

A two-judge Division Bench of the Supreme Court (Chief Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice K. Vinod Chandran), on 19 November 2025, struck down key provisions of the Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021 dealing with the appointment, tenure and service conditions of members of various tribunals. The Court held that those provisions substantially re-enacted, "with minor tweaking", the very clauses of the Tribunal Reforms (Rationalisation and Conditions of Service) Ordinance, 2021 which it had already struck down in Madras Bar Association v. Union of India (2021). To re-enact, by ordinary statute, provisions a constitutional court has declared unconstitutional violates the separation of powers and judicial independence, both basic features of the Constitution.

The Court also granted the Union Government four months to establish a National Tribunals Commission, to ensure tribunal members' independence from executive control through transparent appointment processes and professional oversight.

UPSC angle: Prelims — Tribunal Reforms Act 2021 (appointment/tenure provisions) struck down 19 November 2025; two-judge Division Bench (CJI Gavai + Justice K. Vinod Chandran); four-month directive for National Tribunals Commission; basis was re-enactment of struck-down ordinance. Mains [2016 — Coelho case & judicial review as basic feature] — does the SC's ruling on the Tribunal Reforms Act strengthen the judicial review power over Parliament's corrective legislation, and does it adequately reform tribunal independence?

State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (8 April 2025) — Article 142 and Deemed Assent

A two-judge Division Bench (Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan), on 8 April 2025, held the conduct of Tamil Nadu Governor R.N. Ravi in withholding assent on ten State Bills for periods stretching back to January 2020 as "illegal and erroneous in law". Exercising the Court's plenary power under Article 142, the Bench deemed the ten Bills assented on the date the Governor had received them after reconsideration.

The Bench also laid down indicative timelines: where the Governor reserves a Bill for the President, the President must decide within three months, failing which states may seek judicial intervention. The judgment was widely cited as a precedent for the Kerala Governor's similarly long-pending Bills.

UPSC angle: Prelims — State of TN v. Governor of TN (8 April 2025); two-judge Bench (Pardiwala + Mahadevan); Article 142 used to deem assent on 10 Bills; three-month indicative timeline for President. Mains [2023 — Article 356 reduced frequency since mid-1990s] — does Article 142 "deemed assent" amount to judicial legislation, or is it the legitimate use of complete-justice powers in the face of constitutional sabotage?

In Re: Presidential Reference on Articles 200 & 201 (Advisory Opinion, November 2025)

A five-judge Constitution Bench, hearing a Presidential Reference under Article 143 filed in the wake of State of TN v. Governor (above), delivered an advisory opinion in November 2025. The bench held that judicially fixed deadlines cannot be imposed on the Governor (Article 200) or the President (Article 201) to act on pending Bills, as this would violate the separation of powers. It set aside the indicative timelines from the April 2025 ruling and read down the deemed-assent device as exceptional.

However, the Court did not grant Governors an unlimited pocket-veto — it emphasised that indefinite inaction is a constitutional failure and may still be challenged under Articles 32/226 on the ground of mala fide or non-application of mind. The advisory opinion arose from complaints by Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Telangana and Punjab that Governors had sat on Bills for months or years.

UPSC angle: Prelims — Presidential Reference under Article 143 on Articles 200 & 201 (advisory opinion, November 2025); five-judge bench; rejected court-mandated timelines for Governor/President but kept indefinite inaction reviewable. Mains — how does the November 2025 advisory opinion balance the Governor's constitutional discretion against the State Legislature's democratic mandate, and does it leave States with any effective remedy? [Connected: 2023 Mains — Article 356 jurisprudence]

Waqf Amendment Act 2025 — Supreme Court Partial Stay (September 2025)

The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 was challenged before the Supreme Court in multiple petitions (leading petition: Asaduddin Owaisi v. Union of India). On 15 September 2025, a two-judge Division Bench (Chief Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice A.G. Masih) delivered an interim order declining to stay the Act as a whole, but staying two specific provisions:

1. Section 3(r) — the five-year Islam-practice requirement for a person to create a valid Waqf, held as potentially arbitrary without any mechanism to determine who qualifies as a "practising Muslim."
2. Certain provisions of Section 3C — relating to the District Collector's power to decide whether properties identified as government land overlap with Waqf, finding a prima facie violation of separation of powers.

The Court upheld the removal of "Waqf by user" (Waqf created by long and uninterrupted use), finding prima facie justification for preventing encroachment on government lands. It also directed that the Central Waqf Council must not have more than four non-Muslim members, and State Waqf Boards not more than three. The matter continues before the Court for full hearing.

UPSC angle: Prelims — Waqf Amendment Act 2025; SC partial stay September 15, 2025; five-year Islam practice clause stayed; Section 3C (Collector power) — provisos to sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) stayed; Waqf by user removal upheld; non-Muslim member cap: Central Waqf Council ≤ 4, State Boards ≤ 3. Mains — examine the constitutional dimensions of the Waqf Amendment Act 2025; evaluate the SC's interim order in the context of minority rights under Articles 25–30.

Digital Personal Data Protection — Rules Notified; SC Challenge (2025–2026)

The Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025 were notified by MeitY on 13 November 2025, operationalising the DPDP Act, 2023 (Presidential assent 11 August 2023) in a phased manner:

• Phase 1 (14 November 2025): Procedural provisions — establishment of the Data Protection Board of India (DPBI) (4 members, HQ New Delhi); the Board was notified in the Official Gazette on 14 November 2025
• Phase 2 (14 November 2026): Consent-manager provisions
• Phase 3 (14 May 2027): Substantive data-processing obligations for Data Fiduciaries

On 16 February 2026, the Supreme Court (in The Reporters Collective Trust v. Union of India) issued notice on a writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of the DPDP Act and the DPDP Rules 2025. The core constitutional challenges: (a) Section 44(3) of the DPDP Act amends Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act to dilute the "public interest" override for privacy — the Court referred this question to a larger bench; (b) the Data Protection Board lacks institutional independence (not a court); (c) Section 36 read with Rule 23 empowers the Central Government to call for any information, raising concerns of executive surveillance. The Supreme Court has declined to stay the DPDP framework pending hearing.

UPSC angle: Prelims — DPDP Rules 2025 notified 13 November 2025 by MeitY; Data Protection Board of India (DPBI) established 14 November 2025; three-phase enforcement: Nov 2025 / Nov 2026 / May 2027; SC notice on constitutional challenge 16 February 2026; Section 44(3) RTI amendment referred to larger bench. Mains — examine the DPDP Act 2023 as a right-to-privacy framework under Puttaswamy (2017); identify the key constitutional concerns (executive surveillance, RTI dilution, independent regulator deficit); does the phased rollout adequately protect data principals?

Exam Strategy

For Prelims: Focus on the year, bench size, key ratio decidendi (core holding), and which provisions or amendments were challenged or struck down. The consolidated table above is ideal for quick revision.

For Mains GS-II: Expect questions like "Discuss the evolution of the Basic Structure Doctrine" or "How has the Supreme Court expanded the scope of Article 21?" Structure your answer chronologically, linking one judgment to the next to show evolution.

For Essay: Landmark judgments offer powerful evidence for essays on democracy, rights, judicial activism, and constitutionalism. Quote the most memorable observations — Justice Malhotra's apology to the LGBTQ+ community, Justice Khanna's lonely dissent in ADM Jabalpur, or CJ Chandrachud on electoral transparency.

Common Mains questions:

• Trace the evolution of the Basic Structure Doctrine from Shankari Prasad to Minerva Mills.
• "The Supreme Court has been the guardian of fundamental rights in India." Discuss with reference to at least five landmark judgments.
• Critically examine the role of the judiciary in expanding Article 21 from Maneka Gandhi to Puttaswamy.
• Evaluate the impact of S.R. Bommai on Centre-State relations and the use of Article 356.
• Discuss the Coelho judgment (2007) and its impact on the immunity hitherto enjoyed by laws placed in the Ninth Schedule.
• How does the In Re Article 370 (December 2023) verdict alter the federal architecture of the Indian Union?

Confusion Pairs — High-Risk Distinctions

Cross-Paper Relevance — How Landmark Judgments Travel Across GS Papers

Last updated: 27 May 2026