Cross-paper relevance
- GS2 — Core: 10th Schedule (52nd Amendment, 91st Amendment), Kihoto Hollohan, Speaker's role, PIL (Article 32/226), locus standi, administrative tribunals (Articles 323A/323B), CAT, judicial activism vs restraint
- GS4 — Ethics: anti-defection and legislators' conscience vs party discipline; PIL as a vehicle for accountability; judicial integrity and impartiality
- Essay — Recurring themes: "Is PIL undermining legislative supremacy?"; "India's judicial activism — corrective or overreach?"; "Separation of powers in a parliamentary democracy"
Overview
This chapter covers three interlinked themes that shape the functioning of Indian democracy beyond the basic constitutional framework: (1) the Anti-Defection Law (10th Schedule), which regulates party discipline and floor-crossing; (2) Public Interest Litigation (PIL), which expanded judicial access to the disadvantaged; and (3) Administrative Tribunals (Articles 323A and 323B), which were created to reduce the burden on ordinary courts. Together, these represent key institutional innovations in India's constitutional governance.
1. Anti-Defection Law — 10th Schedule
Background
Political defections plagued Indian democracy from the 1960s onwards. The phenomenon of "Aaya Ram, Gaya Ram" — coined in 1967 when Haryana MLA Gaya Lal switched parties three times in a single day — became symbolic of unprincipled floor-crossing. To curb this menace, the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985 added the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution.
Grounds for Disqualification
| Ground | Detail |
|---|---|
| Voluntary giving up of membership | If an elected member voluntarily gives up membership of the political party on whose ticket he was elected |
| Voting against party direction | If a member votes or abstains from voting in the House contrary to any direction issued by the political party, without obtaining prior permission — and such voting/abstention is not condoned by the party within 15 days |
| Nominated members | A nominated member who joins a political party after the expiry of 6 months from the date of taking seat in the House is disqualified |
| Independent members | An independently elected member who joins any political party after the election is disqualified |
Exception — Merger
The original 10th Schedule provided two exceptions: split (1/3rd of party legislators forming a separate group) and merger (2/3rds of legislators agreeing to merge with another party).
The 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003 made a critical change:
| Before 91st Amendment | After 91st Amendment |
|---|---|
| A split (1/3rd of members breaking away) was recognised as a valid exception to disqualification | The split exception was deleted entirely — 1/3rd breakaways no longer protected |
| Merger (2/3rds) was also recognised | Merger remains the only exception — at least 2/3rds of members of a legislature party must agree to merge with another party |
| Defectors could be immediately appointed as ministers | Defecting legislators are barred from holding ministerial office or any remunerative political post until they are re-elected |
| Council of Ministers had no size limit | Size of Council of Ministers capped at 15% of total strength of the legislative body |
Prelims Trap: The split provision (paragraph 3 of the 10th Schedule) was deleted by the 91st Amendment (2003), not merely amended. Only the merger exception (paragraph 4 — requiring 2/3rds) survives. Many MCQs test whether split is still valid.
Role of the Speaker/Chairman
| Aspect | Detail |
|---|---|
| Deciding authority | The Speaker of the Lok Sabha/Legislative Assembly (or Chairman of the Rajya Sabha/Legislative Council) is the final authority to decide disqualification questions under the 10th Schedule |
| No time limit | There is no prescribed time limit within which the Speaker must decide a disqualification petition — leading to complaints of indefinite delay |
| Criticism | The Speaker, being a member of a political party, may have a conflict of interest; critics argue decisions should be made by an independent body like the Election Commission |
Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992) — Landmark Judgment
| Aspect | Detail |
|---|---|
| Citation | 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651 |
| Bench | 5-judge Constitution Bench |
| Issue | Constitutional validity of the 10th Schedule |
| Key holdings | (1) The 10th Schedule is constitutionally valid and does not violate the basic structure; (2) Paragraph 7 — which barred judicial review of the Speaker's decision — was declared unconstitutional as it violated the basic structure (judicial review); (3) The Speaker's decision is subject to judicial review under Articles 32, 136, and 226, but courts should not interfere until the Speaker has made a decision (no quia timet jurisdiction); (4) The Speaker acts as a tribunal when deciding disqualification cases |
Exam Tip (Mains): The Kihoto Hollohan judgment is critical for questions on judicial review, the Speaker's role, and the balance between party discipline and individual conscience. Always mention that Paragraph 7 was struck down and that the Speaker's decision is reviewable.
Recent Issues and Debates
| Issue | Detail |
|---|---|
| Delay by Speakers | Multiple cases where Speakers have delayed decisions for years — sometimes the entire term of the House expires without a decision; the SC in Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur (2020) held that Speakers should decide disqualification cases within 3 months |
| Wholesale defection | The merger exception has been used to facilitate wholesale defections disguised as mergers — e.g., Goa (2019), Madhya Pradesh (2020), and Maharashtra (2022-23) |
| Dinesh Goswami Committee | Recommended limiting the anti-defection law to confidence motions and no-confidence motions only, allowing free voting on other matters |
| Law Commission (170th Report, 1999) | Recommended that the decision on disqualification should be made by the President/Governor on the advice of the Election Commission, not the Speaker |
2. Public Interest Litigation (PIL)
Origin and Evolution
PIL was an Indian innovation of the late 1970s and 1980s, pioneered by Justice P.N. Bhagwati and Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer. It relaxed the traditional rule of locus standi (standing) — that only an aggrieved person could approach the court — allowing any public-spirited individual or organisation to file a petition on behalf of those unable to access the courts due to poverty, ignorance, or social disadvantage.
Landmark PIL Cases
| Case | Year | Significance |
|---|---|---|
| Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar | 1979 | The first reported PIL case — filed on behalf of undertrial prisoners languishing in Bihar jails; led to the release of over 40,000 undertrial prisoners; established the right to speedy trial as a fundamental right under Article 21 |
| S.P. Gupta v. Union of India | 1981 | Known as the Judges Transfer Case; formally established the relaxation of locus standi — any member of the public or social action group can invoke SC/HC jurisdiction for those unable to do so themselves; defined the conceptual foundation of PIL |
| Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India | 1984 | PIL on bonded labour; SC directed identification, release and rehabilitation of bonded labourers; expanded the scope of PIL to socio-economic rights |
| MC Mehta v. Union of India (multiple cases) | 1986 onwards | Series of PILs on environmental protection — Oleum Gas Leak case (1987, established absolute liability doctrine), Ganga Pollution case, Taj Trapezium case (1996, banned polluting industries near the Taj Mahal), Delhi CNG case (conversion of public transport to CNG) |
| Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan | 1997 | PIL on sexual harassment at workplace; SC laid down the Vishaka Guidelines — binding until the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace Act, 2013 was enacted |
| MC Mehta v. Union of India (CNG case) | 2001-02 | Directed Delhi public transport to convert to CNG; led to significant improvement in Delhi's air quality |
Note: The MC Mehta PILs are among the longest-running in Indian judicial history. The original 1985 PIL on Delhi air pollution was finally disposed of by the Supreme Court on 12 March 2026, after over four decades. This case pioneered the concept of "continuous mandamus" — where the court keeps a case open for years to monitor compliance with its orders.
PIL — Guidelines and Restrictions
Over time, the misuse of PIL led the Supreme Court to establish guidelines:
Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of West Bengal (2004):
| Guideline | Detail |
|---|---|
| Bona fide requirement | The petitioner must be acting in good faith and not for personal gain, private profit, political motivation, or oblique consideration |
| No busybodies | Relaxation of locus standi does not give any right to a "busybody" or "meddlesome interloper" to approach the court under the guise of public interest |
| No personal grievances | If a petition is styled as a PIL but is in reality a means to further personal interests, it must be dismissed |
| Court's duty | The court must ensure the petitioner is genuinely acting in public interest and not abusing the judicial process |
Other restrictions evolved through case law:
- PIL should not be a substitute for the normal legal process
- Courts must impose exemplary costs on frivolous PILs to deter misuse
- PIL cannot be used for matters concerning individual service grievances, landlord-tenant disputes, or ordinary commercial matters
Judicial Activism vs. Judicial Restraint
| Concept | Judicial Activism | Judicial Restraint |
|---|---|---|
| Definition | Courts proactively expand their role beyond traditional boundaries — interpreting the Constitution broadly, issuing directions to the executive, and filling legislative gaps | Courts exercise self-limitation, deferring to the legislature and executive on policy matters and interpreting the Constitution conservatively |
| Examples | PIL movement, Vishaka Guidelines, Right to Education (Unni Krishnan, 1993), ban on liquor near highways, firecracker regulations | Courts refusing to interfere in matters of economic policy, nuclear energy decisions, or foreign policy |
| Arguments for | Protects fundamental rights of the marginalised; holds the executive accountable; fills governance gaps | Separation of powers; democratic legitimacy — elected representatives, not judges, should make policy; courts lack the expertise and resources for governance |
| Arguments against | Judicial overreach — courts usurp legislative/executive functions; "unelected judiciary" making policy for millions; "judicial populism" — decisions driven by public sentiment | May lead to denial of justice when the legislature and executive fail to act; may allow unconstitutional executive action to continue unchecked |
Mains Relevance: "Judicial activism is a necessary corrective but not a permanent substitute for good governance." This is a classic GS2 essay angle. Discuss both positions with examples — Vishaka (activism filling a legislative gap) vs. the NJAC verdict (activism striking down a law passed unanimously by Parliament).
3. Administrative Tribunals — Articles 323A and 323B
Constitutional Framework
Articles 323A and 323B were inserted by the 42nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1976 (Part XIV-A — Tribunals) to reduce the burden on the regular court system by providing specialised forums for specific categories of disputes.
| Feature | Article 323A | Article 323B |
|---|---|---|
| Subject | Disputes relating to recruitment and conditions of service of public servants | Disputes relating to other specified matters — taxation, foreign exchange, industrial/labour disputes, land reforms, ceiling on urban property, food, rent control, etc. |
| Who can establish | Only Parliament | Both Parliament and State Legislatures |
| Key tribunal | Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) | Various — e.g., Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), National Green Tribunal (NGT), Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT), Debt Recovery Tribunals (DRT) |
| Exclusion of HC jurisdiction | Parliament can provide for exclusion of the jurisdiction of all courts (except the SC under Article 136) | Parliament/State Legislature can provide for exclusion of jurisdiction of all courts (except SC under Article 136) |
Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT)
| Aspect | Detail |
|---|---|
| Established | 1985, under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 |
| Purpose | Adjudication of disputes relating to recruitment and conditions of service of Central Government employees |
| Principal Bench | New Delhi |
| Circuit Benches | 17 regular benches across India |
| Composition | Chairman + Members (judicial and administrative); Chairman must have been a High Court judge; judicial members must be qualified to be HC judges; administrative members must have held senior government positions |
| Jurisdiction | Covers all-India services, Central civil services, civilian defence employees, and other Central Government employees |
| State counterpart | State Administrative Tribunals (SATs) established in some states for state government employee disputes |
Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021
The Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 (replacing an ordinance of April 2021) made significant changes to the tribunal system:
| Reform | Detail |
|---|---|
| Abolition of tribunals | Abolished 9 appellate tribunals, transferring their functions to existing courts — including the Film Certification Appellate Tribunal, Airports Economic Regulatory Authority Appellate Tribunal, and others |
| Uniform service conditions | Prescribed uniform conditions for chairpersons and members — 4-year term (or until age 65/67 for members/chairpersons), minimum 50 years of age for appointment |
| Selection committees | Constituted Search-cum-Selection Committees headed by the CJI or a SC judge for recommending appointments |
| Supreme Court scrutiny | The SC in Madras Bar Association v. Union of India (2021) struck down provisions fixing a 4-year term (too short for independence) and the minimum age requirement (50 years) as unconstitutional |
Key Constitutional Issue: The Supreme Court has consistently held that tribunals must have independence comparable to courts — security of tenure, adequate service conditions, and appointment by a process involving judicial participation. The Government's attempts to control tribunals through executive-dominated appointments and short tenures have been repeatedly struck down.
Key Tribunals in India
| Tribunal | Established | Jurisdiction | Constitutional/Statutory Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| CAT | 1985 | Central government service disputes | Article 323A; Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 |
| ITAT | 1941 | Income tax appeals | Income Tax Act, 1961 |
| NGT | 2010 | Environmental disputes | National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 |
| AFT | 2009 | Armed forces service disputes | Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 |
| NCLAT | 2016 | Appeals from NCLT (company/insolvency matters) | Companies Act, 2013; IBC, 2016 |
| DRT | 1993 | Recovery of debts by banks/financial institutions | Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 |
| Lokpal | 2019 (operationalised) | Corruption complaints against public servants | Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 |
4. Comparison — Anti-Defection, PIL, and Tribunals
| Feature | Anti-Defection Law | PIL | Administrative Tribunals |
|---|---|---|---|
| Purpose | Prevent unprincipled party-switching | Ensure access to justice for disadvantaged sections | Reduce court burden, provide specialised adjudication |
| Constitutional basis | 10th Schedule (52nd Amendment, 1985) | Articles 32 and 226 (expanded interpretation) | Articles 323A and 323B (42nd Amendment, 1976) |
| Key reform | 91st Amendment (2003) — deleted split, retained merger | Evolving — guidelines against misuse | Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 |
| Deciding authority | Speaker/Chairman | Supreme Court/High Courts | Tribunal members (judicial + administrative) |
| Judicial review | Speaker's decision reviewable (Kihoto Hollohan, 1992) | PIL itself is an exercise of judicial review | Tribunal orders appealable to HC/SC |
| Criticism | Curbs individual conscience, Speaker bias, delays | Judicial overreach, frivolous petitions | Lack of independence, executive control, short tenures |
5. UPSC Relevance — Exam Strategy
Prelims Focus Areas
- 52nd Amendment (1985) — added 10th Schedule; 91st Amendment (2003) — deleted split provision, retained merger (2/3rds)
- Kihoto Hollohan (1992) — Paragraph 7 struck down, Speaker's decision subject to judicial review
- Speaker decides disqualification under 10th Schedule — no time limit (SC suggested 3 months in 2020)
- PIL origin — Hussainara Khatoon (1979, first reported PIL), S.P. Gupta (1981, locus standi relaxed)
- Article 323A — administrative tribunals (only Parliament can establish); 323B — other tribunals (both Parliament and State Legislatures)
- CAT established 1985 — Principal Bench in New Delhi, 17 benches nationwide
- Tribunals Reforms Act 2021 — abolished 9 tribunals
Mains Focus Areas
- Should anti-defection decisions be transferred from the Speaker to an independent body?
- PIL and judicial activism — necessary corrective or judicial overreach?
- Are tribunals truly independent? Impact of the Tribunals Reforms Act and SC judgments
- MC Mehta's environmental PILs — continuous mandamus as an innovation
- Dinesh Goswami Committee and Law Commission recommendations on anti-defection reform
- Separation of powers — where to draw the line between judicial activism and legislative supremacy
Key Connections for Answer Writing
- Link anti-defection to inner-party democracy — does the law kill dissent within parties?
- Link PIL to basic structure — access to justice as a fundamental right under Article 21
- Link tribunals to separation of powers — are tribunals a substitute for courts or an executive tool?
- Link all three to good governance — anti-defection ensures stable government, PIL ensures accountability, tribunals ensure speedy dispute resolution
Recent Developments (2024–2026)
SC Calls for Parliament to Review Speaker's Role in Anti-Defection Cases (2024–2025)
In Padi Kaushik Reddy v. State of Telangana (2025), the Supreme Court criticised the Telangana Assembly Speaker for extended delays in deciding disqualification petitions against MLAs who had defected. The Court called on Parliament to consider whether entrusting disqualification decisions to the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule continues to serve the anti-defection law's purpose, given endemic delays and the Speaker's partisan position.
The Court reaffirmed that the Speaker acting as Tenth Schedule tribunal does not enjoy constitutional immunity under Article 212, and that all Tenth Schedule decisions are judicially reviewable — building on Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992).
UPSC angle: Prelims — Padi Kaushik Reddy (2025); Speaker under Tenth Schedule not immune under Article 212; SC called for parliamentary review. Mains — critically examine whether the Speaker is an appropriate adjudicatory authority for anti-defection cases; assess proposals for an independent Election Commission-based tribunal.
Maharashtra Political Crisis — Tenth Schedule's Limitations Exposed (2022–2024)
The Maharashtra political crisis (Shiv Sena split, June 2022) generated a series of landmark constitutional rulings. In Subhash Desai v. Governor of Maharashtra (2023), a five-judge Constitution Bench held that the then-Governor's floor test invitation to Eknath Shinde was constitutionally flawed, but did not restore Uddhav Thackeray's government.
Speaker Rahul Narvekar's Ruling (January 2024): Maharashtra Assembly Speaker Rahul Narvekar delivered his ruling on 10 January 2024 — recognising the Shinde faction as the "real Shiv Sena" (based on the 1999 party constitution, which did not vest removal powers in Uddhav Thackeray), and refusing to disqualify 16 Shinde-faction MLAs who had defected in June 2022. He also dismissed cross-petitions by the Shinde faction against Thackeray faction MLAs. This ruling came after the Supreme Court, in Subhash Desai (2023), had directed the Speaker to decide the disqualification petitions expeditiously.
Uddhav Thackeray moves Supreme Court (January 2024): Thackeray challenged Speaker Narvekar's ruling before the Supreme Court on 15 January 2024, arguing the Speaker's decision was "contrary to Supreme Court's judgment" in Subhash Desai and devoid of constitutional and legal basis. LiveLaw (January 2024) noted the ruling's legal infirmities: the Speaker cannot rely on the numerical majority of defecting MLAs to decide which faction is the "real party" — the Subhash Desai judgment had explicitly held this. The case remained sub judice in the Supreme Court as of May 2026.
The case illustrates the Tenth Schedule's structural vulnerability: the Speaker deciding disqualification is appointed by the very faction whose disqualification is sought — a structural conflict of interest that the Law Commission (170th Report, 1999) and the Keisham Meghachandra Singh (2020) judgment have both flagged.
UPSC angle: Prelims — Speaker Narvekar ruling 10 January 2024; Subhash Desai v. Governor of Maharashtra (2023); five-judge bench; anti-defection; Speaker conflict of interest; Uddhav SC challenge (January 2024). Mains — evaluate the Maharashtra political crisis as a case study in the failure of the anti-defection mechanism; propose constitutional reforms to address structural deficiencies; does the Maharashtra case strengthen the argument for transferring Tenth Schedule adjudication to the Election Commission?
MP Bribery Case — Parliamentary Privilege Redefined (2024)
In Sita Soren v. Union of India (2024), a seven-judge Constitution Bench unanimously held that legislators who accept bribes to vote or speak in Parliament cannot claim parliamentary privilege under Article 105(2)/194(2). The Court overruled P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (1998, five-judge, 3:2) which had controversially immunised bribed legislators from criminal prosecution.
The ruling directly connects to PIL: in the original case, a PIL challenging the bribery in the JMM Parliament Bribery Case had been the vehicle through which the PV Narasimha Rao judgment was reviewed three decades later.
UPSC angle: Prelims — Sita Soren v. Union of India (2024); seven-judge bench; bribery not covered by Article 105(2) privilege; overruled PV Narasimha Rao (1998). Mains — analyse how the Sita Soren judgment reshapes the relationship between PIL, parliamentary privilege, and anti-corruption norms in Indian constitutional law.
SC Flags PIL Misuse — "Private, Publicity, Paisa, Political" (May 2026)
On 5 May 2026, in proceedings before a nine-judge Constitution Bench (headed by CJI Surya Kant) hearing the Sabarimala review case, Justice B.V. Nagarathna made landmark observations on PIL misuse. She stated: "PIL — Public Interest Litigation — has now become private interest litigation, publicity interest litigation, paisa interest litigation, and political interest litigation." (Business Standard, 5 May 2026; Bar and Bench, 5 May 2026)
Justice Nagarathna noted: courts "are entertaining PILs here for genuine causes, for giving relief to the public in need of it, not for articles written in newspapers." She raised concern about attempts to convert routine grievances into PILs, observing that hundreds of letters received by the CJI's office cannot all be converted into Article 32 petitions.
The observation followed a pattern of the SC imposing exemplary costs on frivolous PILs — including a March 2026 dismissal of a PIL on whether onions and garlic contain "tamasic" energy (CJI Surya Kant called it frivolous) and a 2025 case where ₹5,00,000 in costs were imposed on a repeat frivolous filer.
Context: Every frivolous Article 32 petition displaces a genuine fundamental rights matter from the Supreme Court's roster. The SC has consistently balanced PIL's original purpose — access to justice for the marginalised — against its growing misuse as a tool of political warfare or personal publicity. CJI Sanjiv Khanna (November 2024 – May 2025) had earlier emphasised that courts should not be turned into instruments of political litigation.
UPSC angle: Prelims — PIL under Article 32 (SC) / Article 226 (HC); locus standi relaxed; SC imposes costs for frivolous PILs; Justice BV Nagarathna's "private, publicity, paisa, political" observation (5 May 2026). Mains — evaluate PIL as a tool for social justice and governmental accountability (Prelims 2027 / Mains 2026 angle); where does the line between legitimate public interest and "publicity interest" litigation lie; critically examine the SC's increasingly restrictive approach to PIL locus standi.
Vocabulary
Defection
- Pronunciation: /dɪˈfɛkʃən/
- Definition: The act of an elected legislator abandoning allegiance to the political party on whose ticket they were elected — either by voluntarily giving up party membership, voting against the party whip, or abstaining from voting contrary to party directions — resulting in disqualification under the 10th Schedule of the Constitution.
- Root: Latin dēficere = to desert, fail; dē- = away from + facere = to do, make; noun form dēfectiō
- Origin: From Latin dēfectiō ("a failing, revolt, desertion"), from dēficere ("to undo, fail, desert"), from dē- ("from, away") + facere ("to do, to make").
- Part of Speech: noun
- Word Family: defect (n/v), defector (n), defective (adj), defectively (adv), defectiveness (n)
- Usage: The Tenth Schedule was inserted to curb the rampant defection that had reduced legislative loyalty to a marketable commodity, thereby insulating the people's mandate from the lure of office and lucre.
- Synonyms: desertion, apostasy, def' to (turncoating), abandonment, disloyalty, secession
- Antonyms: allegiance, loyalty, fidelity, adherence
- Mnemonic: DEFECTion shares its root with DEFECT — a defector is one who "defects," i.e. leaves a fault in the ranks by walking away (de- "away" + facere "to do") to join the other side.
Locus Standi
- Pronunciation: /ˈloʊkəs ˈstændaɪ/
- Definition: The right or capacity of a party to bring an action before a court — traditionally, only a person who has suffered a legal injury can invoke the court's jurisdiction. PIL relaxed this requirement, allowing any public-spirited person to approach the court on behalf of those unable to do so.
- Root: Latin locus = place, position + standī (gerund of stāre) = to stand; lit. 'a place of standing'
- Origin: From Latin locus ("place, position") + standī, gerund of stāre ("to stand") — literally "a place of standing" before the court.
- Part of Speech: noun (Latin phrase used in English; chiefly Law)
- Word Family: locus (n), stare decisis (n related legal phrase), standing (n legal equivalent)
- Usage: By progressively relaxing the rigid requirement of locus standi and admitting public interest litigation, the Supreme Court enabled conscientious citizens to seek redress on behalf of those too poor or voiceless to approach the court themselves, thereby democratising access to constitutional justice.
- Synonyms: standing, legal standing, right of audience, title to sue, right to be heard, capacity to sue
- Antonyms: non-joinder, want of standing, disqualification, ineligibility
- Mnemonic: "Locus" = location/place (think locate) + "standi" = to stand: literally "a place to stand" in court, i.e. the right to stand before the judge and be heard.
Key Terms
Anti-Defection Law
- Pronunciation: /ˌæntɪ dɪˈfɛkʃən lɔː/
- Definition: The constitutional provision contained in the Tenth Schedule — added by the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985 — that provides for disqualification of elected members of Parliament and State Legislatures on the ground of defection from the party on whose ticket they were elected. A member is disqualified if they voluntarily give up party membership, vote or abstain contrary to party direction without prior permission (and the party does not condone it within 15 days), or if an independently elected member joins any political party after the election. The only surviving exception is merger — when at least 2/3rds of members of a legislature party agree to merge with another party (the original split exception requiring only 1/3rd was deleted by the 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003). The 91st Amendment also barred defecting members from holding ministerial office until re-election and capped the Council of Ministers at 15% of the House's total strength.
- Context: The law was enacted to combat the "Aaya Ram, Gaya Ram" phenomenon of the 1960s-70s. The Speaker/Chairman of the House is the final deciding authority on disqualification, acting as a tribunal. In Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992), the Supreme Court upheld the 10th Schedule's validity but struck down Paragraph 7 (which barred judicial review) as unconstitutional — holding that the Speaker's decision is subject to judicial review under Articles 32, 136, and 226. The SC in Keisham Meghachandra Singh (2020) recommended Speakers decide within 3 months. Critics argue the law kills intra-party dissent, and the Dinesh Goswami Committee recommended limiting it to confidence/no-confidence motions only. The Law Commission's 170th Report (1999) recommended transferring the deciding power from the Speaker to the President/Governor acting on the Election Commission's advice.
- UPSC Relevance: GS2 Polity — Prelims: 52nd Amendment (1985), 10th Schedule, 91st Amendment (2003) deleted split provision (para 3), merger requires 2/3rds (para 4), Speaker decides, Kihoto Hollohan (1992) struck down para 7, Council of Ministers capped at 15%; Mains: should the deciding authority be the Speaker or an independent body, impact on inner-party democracy, misuse of merger exception, Dinesh Goswami and Law Commission recommendations, tension between party discipline and individual conscience.
Public Interest Litigation
- Pronunciation: /ˈpʌblɪk ˈɪntrəst ˌlɪtɪˈɡeɪʃən/
- Definition: A legal innovation of the Indian judiciary — pioneered by Justices P.N. Bhagwati and V.R. Krishna Iyer in the late 1970s — that relaxes the traditional rule of locus standi to allow any public-spirited individual or social action group to invoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (Article 32) or High Courts (Article 226) on behalf of persons who, by reason of poverty, disability, or social/economic disadvantage, are unable to approach the court themselves. The first reported PIL was Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1979), which led to the release of over 40,000 undertrial prisoners and established speedy trial as a right under Article 21. S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981) formally established the conceptual and doctrinal foundation of PIL.
- Context: PIL was an Indian response to the inaccessibility of the formal legal system to the poor and marginalised. Major PILs include MC Mehta's environmental cases (1985 onwards — Ganga pollution, Taj Trapezium, Delhi CNG, absolute liability doctrine), Vishaka Guidelines on workplace sexual harassment (1997), and the Right to Food case (PUCL v. UOI, 2001). However, misuse led to the SC laying down guidelines in Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of West Bengal (2004) — PILs must be bona fide, not motivated by personal gain or political objectives, and courts must not entertain "busybodies" or "meddlesome interlopers." The MC Mehta PIL on Delhi air pollution, filed in 1985, was the longest-running PIL in Indian history, finally disposed of on 12 March 2026 after over four decades — pioneering the concept of "continuing mandamus."
- UPSC Relevance: GS2 Polity — Prelims: Hussainara Khatoon (1979, first PIL), S.P. Gupta (1981, locus standi), Article 32 and 226 as PIL bases, MC Mehta environmental PILs, Ashok Kumar Pandey guidelines; Justice BV Nagarathna's "private, publicity, paisa, political" observation (5 May 2026, nine-judge bench, Sabarimala review); Mains (Mains 2026 angle): judicial activism vs judicial restraint, PIL as a tool for social justice vs judicial overreach, should courts make policy through PILs, continuing mandamus as an innovation, PIL and the separation of powers doctrine, SC's increasingly strict scrutiny of PIL locus standi.
UPSC Mains PYQs — Verified Deep Links
- GS2 2024 Q15 — Explain the reasons for the growth of public interest litigation in India. As a result of it, has the Indian Supreme Court emerged as the world's most powerful apex court? Justify your answer. (15M)
- GS2 2018 Q12 — How far do you agree with the view that tribunals curtail the jurisdiction of ordinary courts? In view of the above, discuss the constitutional validity and competence of the tribunals in India. (15M)
- GS2 2019 Q13 — The Central Administrative Tribunal which was established for the redressal of grievances and complaints by or against the central government employees, nowadays is much under fire. Discuss. (15M)
- GS2 2014 Q1 — Starting from inventing the 'basic structure' doctrine, the judiciary has played a highly proactive role in ensuring that India develops into a thriving democracy. Critically evaluate the role played by judicial activism in achieving the ideals of democracy. (15M)
Cross-link: For current affairs on judicial pronouncements, PIL developments, and anti-defection cases, follow Ujiyari.com.
Sources
- Constitution of India — Tenth Schedule, Articles 323A, 323B
- The 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985 and the 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003
- Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992 Supp (2) SCC 651)
- S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (AIR 1982 SC 149)
- Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of West Bengal (2004) 3 SCC 349
- Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 — indiacode.nic.in
- Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 — PRS Legislative Research
- Law Commission of India, 170th Report (1999) — Reform of the Electoral Laws
- M. Laxmikanth, Indian Polity (7th Edition) — Chapters on Anti-Defection, PIL, and Tribunals
BharatNotes