SCO — Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

Origins and Evolution

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is a Eurasian political, economic, and security intergovernmental organisation tracing its origins to the Shanghai Five, formed on 26 April 1996 among China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to resolve border demarcation and demilitarisation issues along the former Soviet-Chinese frontier.

On 15 June 2001, the SCO was formally established in Shanghai when Uzbekistan joined the Shanghai Five. The SCO Charter was signed on 7 June 2002 in St. Petersburg and entered into force on 19 September 2003.

Current Membership (10 Full Members, as of 2024)

Observer States: Mongolia; Afghanistan (participation inactive under Taliban governance)

Dialogue Partners (15, as of Sep 2026): Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cambodia, Egypt, Kuwait, Laos, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, UAE. The UAE was admitted at the Samarkand summit (Decision No 11, 16 September 2022, Uzbek chairmanship); the memorandum granting it the status was signed on 5 May 2023 in Panaji, during India's presidency. Laos became the 15th dialogue partner at Tianjin (Decision No 3, 1 September 2025); the memorandum on its status was signed on 10 July 2026 (SCO Secretariat, Observers and dialogue partners page, accessed 22 Sep 2026).

From Observer and Dialogue Partner to "SCO Partner": The Tianjin Council of Heads of State (1 September 2025) decided to introduce a single "SCO Partner" status and abolish the Observer and Dialogue Partner statuses. Until the amendments to the Charter enter into force, the current observers and dialogue partners keep their existing statuses. A Protocol on Amendments and Additions to the SCO Charter was approved at the Bishkek summit (1 September 2026); the SCO readout gives neither its content nor a date of entry into force, so the new status should not be treated as operational yet.

SCO and the CIS: Tianjin also took a decision on SCO observer status in the Commonwealth of Independent States. The direction matters for Prelims: the SCO obtains observer status at the CIS, not the other way round (SCO Bishkek readout, 1 Sep 2026).

India-Pakistan simultaneous admission (2017): China backed Pakistan's entry as a condition for India's membership, giving the organisation a South Asian dimension. The SCO now covers ~40% of the world's population and ~30% of global GDP.

SCO Charter: The "Shanghai Spirit"

The SCO's guiding philosophy — the "Shanghai Spirit" — emphasises:

• Mutual trust and mutual benefit
• Equality and consultation
• Respect for cultural diversity
• Pursuit of common development
• Non-alignment, non-confrontation, non-targeting of third parties

The Three Evils: The SCO's core security mandate targets what it calls the "three evils" — terrorism, separatism, and extremism. This is operationalised through the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) in Tashkent.

Three Pillars of SCO Cooperation

1. Security Cooperation

• RATS (Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure): Based in Tashkent; coordinates counter-terrorism, anti-separatism, and anti-extremism activities
• Peace Mission exercises: Joint military exercises among SCO member states (e.g., Peace Mission 2023 in Russia)
• Counter-narcotics cooperation — critical given Afghanistan's opium production affecting Central Asia
• Information security cooperation — cybersecurity norms and information space governance
• New security bodies (2025–26): At Tianjin (1 Sep 2025) members signed agreements on the SCO Anti-Drug Centre and the Universal Centre for Countering Challenges and Threats to the Security of SCO Member States, and a launch ceremony for the centres was held (the Chinese host's readout counts four centres inaugurated, adding ones for transnational organised crime and information security; the SCO Secretariat names two signed agreements). At Bishkek (1 Sep 2026) the CHS decided to approve the provisions on the Universal Centre and on the Executive Committee of the Anti-Drug Centre. RATS continues alongside them (Director of the RATS Executive Committee at Bishkek: Ularbek Sharsheev)

2. Economic Cooperation

• Facilitation of trade and investment; SCO Business Council and SCO Interbank Consortium
• Energy cooperation — Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan are energy producers; China and India are major consumers
• INSTC (International North-South Transport Corridor): India-Russia-Iran-Central Asia connectivity route; SCO context provides framework
• SCO Development Bank (decided, not established): At Tianjin (1 Sep 2025) the "relevant member states" decided to establish the bank and to accelerate consultations on it. The Moscow Heads of Government meeting (18 Nov 2025) still referred to implementing the "political decision to establish the SCO Development Bank by interested parties", and the Bishkek summit readout (1 Sep 2026) does not mention it. Separately, at Tianjin Xi pledged 2 billion yuan (about USD 281 million) in grants to other SCO members within 2025 and 10 billion yuan in loans to the member banks of the SCO Interbank Consortium over the following three years (Government of China, 1 Sep 2025). These are Chinese pledges, not the bank's capital, and as of the Bishkek summit there is no record of the bank being set up

3. Cultural and Humanitarian Cooperation

• SCO University (network of universities in member states)
• Youth exchanges and SCO Tourism Programme
• India initiated cooperation in traditional medicine, startup ecosystem, and shared Buddhist heritage during its 2023 Presidency

Key SCO Institutions

Secretary-General (as of Sep 2026): Nurlan Yermekbayev of Kazakhstan, who took office in January 2025 (China MFA reception for his assumption of office, 17 Jan 2025) and was present at both the Tianjin (2025) and Bishkek (2026) summits.

India and the SCO — Three Phases

Phase 1 (2005–2017): Observer status India was an observer from the Tashkent Summit (2005); participated in deliberations without voting rights.

Phase 2 (2017–2023): Full membership India and Pakistan admitted simultaneously at the Astana Summit (June 2017). China backed Pakistan's simultaneous entry as a quid pro quo. India used SCO to engage Central Asian nations and the Russia-China axis.

Phase 3 (2023–present): Presidency and reset India held the SCO Presidency in 2023; at the Tianjin Summit (2025), PM Modi attended in person — the first visit to China since the Galwan confrontation (2020) — signalling a diplomatic reset. Modi attended the Bishkek Summit in person as well (1 Sep 2026).

India's Priorities and Constraints Within the SCO

India's Agenda

India's Core Constraints

1. Pakistan factor: India cannot use land routes through Pakistan to access Central Asia — severely limiting India's participation in SCO land connectivity projects
2. China-Pakistan alignment: On terrorism, CPEC, and Kashmir, China and Pakistan vote together — blocking India's counter-terrorism agenda in RATS
3. BRI linkage: Many SCO connectivity projects overlap with BRI; India objects to CPEC passing through PoK
4. Russia's Ukraine war: Complicated India's engagement at the 2023 virtual summit; India's non-alignment tested

How the constraint plays out. India's External Affairs Ministry has noted that India refused to support SCO documents containing references to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which passes through Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK), territory India claims as its own. Pakistan remains a full member throughout — the SCO's founding documents contain no suspension mechanism — so India's only lever is the consensus rule.

The sharpest test came at the SCO Defence Ministers' Meeting in Qingdao, China (26 June 2025), weeks after Operation Sindoor (May 2025), India's strikes on terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan following the Pahalgam attack of 22 April 2025. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh declined to endorse the draft joint statement because, as reported by AP, it left out the Pahalgam attack while referring to militant activity in Balochistan; Singh urged the SCO to criticise countries that use cross-border terrorism as an instrument of policy. With no consensus, no joint statement was issued (MEA, as reported by All India Radio). Because the SCO works by consensus, a single member can block a document, and India used that rule to keep a terrorism text it saw as one-sided from being adopted, while retaining its membership as a strategic instrument for Central Asian connectivity.

Key SCO Summits

India's 2023 SCO Presidency — What Was Achieved

India held the SCO Chair in 2022–23 and hosted the summit in virtual format (4 July 2023) — avoiding a physically hosted Putin or Xi visit given Russia-Ukraine war and India-China border tensions, and avoiding hosting PM Shehbaz Sharif on Indian soil.

Theme: "Towards a SECURE SCO" (Security, Economic development, Connectivity, Unity, Respect for sovereignty, Environmental protection)

New cooperation pillars India initiated:

• Startups and Innovation
• Traditional Medicine (Ayurveda/AYUSH)
• Millet promotion
• Digital Inclusion
• Youth Empowerment
• Shared Buddhist Heritage

Key outcome: Iran formally admitted as the 9th full member. These themes — areas of Indian strength — continue to shape India's SCO agenda at subsequent summits.

Astana Summit 2024 — Key Outcomes

The 24th Council of Heads of State met in Astana, Kazakhstan on 3–4 July 2024. PM Modi did not attend; EAM S. Jaishankar represented India.

• Belarus admitted as the 10th full member — the first exclusively European state to join, a year after Iran's accession
• Astana Declaration adopted
• 25 strategic documents signed — energy cooperation, security, trade, finance, information security
• New anti-terrorism programme for 2025–2027
• India's priorities at the summit: counter-terrorism through the RATS mechanism; connectivity through the INSTC and Chabahar; and AI governance

Jaishankar's bilateral with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the summit margins proved an important precursor to the October 2024 LAC disengagement agreement, with both sides agreeing to expedite resolution of the remaining friction points in Eastern Ladakh.

Tianjin Summit 2025 — India-China Reset

The 25th Council of Heads of State — described by the Chinese host as the largest SCO summit ever held, by attendance at the SCO Plus session (Xinhua, 1 Sep 2025) — met in Tianjin, China on 31 August – 1 September 2025 under China's chairmanship (2024–2025). It was China's fifth turn as summit host (Shanghai 2001 and 2006, Beijing 2012, Qingdao 2018, Tianjin 2025). The CHS itself met on 1 September 2025 at the Meijiang International Convention and Exhibition Center under Xi Jinping's chairmanship. PM Modi and Pakistan PM Shehbaz Sharif both attended.

What was approved: 24 documents, including the Tianjin Declaration, the SCO Development Strategy until 2035, and a statement on the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second World War and the founding of the UN. The summit also took the decisions on the SCO Development Bank, the new security centres and the "SCO Partner" status covered in the sections above. The 2025–2026 chairmanship passed to the Kyrgyz Republic, under the theme "25 Years of the SCO: Together for Sustainable Peace, Development and Prosperity" (translations vary slightly).

Terrorism language — India's gain. The Tianjin Declaration strongly condemned the Pahalgam terror attack (22 April 2025) by name and called for those responsible to be brought to justice, rejected double standards in counter-terrorism, and called for combating the cross-border movement of terrorists. The balance matters for Mains answers: the same passage also condemned the Jaffar Express (11 March 2025) and Khuzdar (21 May 2025) attacks in Pakistan. The contrast with Qingdao, just over two months earlier, is the point — a heads-of-state text that named Pahalgam was one India could sign. No India-Pakistan bilateral took place at the summit.

Belt and Road paragraph. India signed the Tianjin Declaration, but is not among the eight members that "reaffirm their support" for the Belt and Road Initiative: Belarus, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (China, as BRI's proposer, is not in the list either).

Modi-Xi bilateral, 31 August 2025. PM Modi and President Xi held their first bilateral meeting on Chinese soil in nearly seven years — Modi's first trip to China since Galwan (2020), and their previous meeting had been on the margins of the BRICS Kazan Summit in October 2024. Both leaders welcomed the progress made since Kazan and the October 2024 LAC disengagement agreement. Per the Foreign Secretary's briefing (MEA, 31 Aug 2025):

• Consensus reached on restarting direct flights between India and China, with operational details to follow
• Both leaders reaffirmed that India and China are development partners, not rivals
• Modi invited Xi to the BRICS Summit that India hosts in 2026
• A pledge to expand bilateral trade and investment ties

Global Governance Initiative (GGI) — a Chinese initiative, not an SCO decision: at the separate "SCO Plus" meeting the same day, Xi proposed a Global Governance Initiative built on sovereign equality and the international rule of law, the fourth such Chinese initiative after the Global Development, Global Security and Global Civilization Initiatives. It does not appear in the Tianjin Declaration and is not an SCO outcome (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs readout, 2 Sep 2025).

Council of Heads of Government — Moscow, November 2025

The 24th Council of Heads of Government met in Moscow on 18 November 2025 under Russian chairmanship, with EAM S. Jaishankar representing India. It adopted a Joint Communiqué, took decisions on trade, railway transport and social protection, approved the SCO budget, and set the next meeting for 2026 in Tajikistan. Keep the two tiers apart for Prelims: the Council of Heads of State (CHS) is the annual summit; the Council of Heads of Government (CHG) deals with economic cooperation and the organisation's budget, and meets in a different host country from the summit (Moscow 2025, Tajikistan 2026, while Kyrgyzstan chaired).

Council of Foreign Ministers — Cholpon-Ata, July 2026

The SCO Council of Foreign Ministers met at Cholpon-Ata, Kyrgyzstan, ahead of the summit. Its statement of 24 July 2026 condemned terrorism in all its forms and said double standards in the fight against terrorism are unacceptable, language India has consistently pushed for. On West Asia, it reaffirmed the Tianjin Declaration's condemnation of military strikes on Iran, calling them a flagrant violation of international law, and offered condolences on the death of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. With Iran a full member, SCO texts now carry West Asia positions that India has to weigh against its own ties in the region.

Bishkek Summit 2026 — the Anniversary Year and the Handover to Pakistan

The 26th Council of Heads of State met on 1 September 2026 at the Yrys-Ordo Congress Hall, Bishkek, chaired by President Sadyr Japarov (summit events ran 31 August–1 September), in the SCO's 25th-anniversary year. PM Modi and Pakistan PM Shehbaz Sharif both attended.

What was decided: 28 documents were approved, including the Bishkek Declaration and the Protocol on Amendments and Additions to the SCO Charter. The CHS approved the provisions on the Universal Centre for Countering Challenges and Threats and on the Executive Committee of the SCO Anti-Drug Centre, and decided to sign a Memorandum of Understanding between the SCO Secretariat and the African Union Commission (a decision to sign, not a signed MoU).

India's message: Modi called on members to dismantle the ecosystem of terrorist financing, recruitment, radicalisation and safe havens, and said there can be no place for double standards on terrorism. He said wars are not a solution, stressed respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity in connectivity, and pointed to India's proposed SCO Civilisation Dialogue Forum, whose inaugural session is scheduled to be held in India in 2026 (All India Radio, 1 Sep 2026).

Handover: the Kyrgyz Republic passed the 2026–27 chairmanship to Pakistan, whose theme is "Turning Vision into Action: Connectivity, Innovation and Shared Prosperity". Lahore was named SCO Tourism and Cultural Capital for 2026–27. The 27th CHS therefore falls in Pakistan's chair year; the SCO's readout gives no city or date for it (as of 22 Sep 2026).

SCO's Geopolitical Significance

The SCO is unusual among multilateral organisations because it:

1. Brings together India, China, Russia, Pakistan, and Central Asian states — potentially the most consequential geopolitical cluster in Eurasia
2. Provides India a platform to engage China and Russia without the US-dominated frameworks (NATO, QUAD)
3. Represents a non-Western multilateral architecture that is neither anti-Western nor irrelevant
4. Tests India's multi-alignment doctrine — being in QUAD and SCO simultaneously

Cross-paper relevance

• GS2 (primary) — SCO founding and membership (India since 2017); Astana 2024, Tianjin 2025 and Bishkek 2026 summits; India-Pakistan coexistence in SCO; SCO on terrorism; connectivity issues (CPEC objection)
• GS3 — SCO as platform for Central Asian trade; energy resource access; Afghanistan's observer status
• GS4 (Ethics) — Participating in China-dominated multilateral body: strategic necessity or compromise?; multi-alignment doctrine and its ethical dimensions
• Essay — "SCO: India's bridge to Eurasia or China's extended sphere?"; "India's multi-alignment: balancing the Quad and the SCO"

What Changed in 2024–2026

The two years from Astana to Bishkek turned the SCO from a forum India attended into a forum India used. At Astana in July 2024 India sent its External Affairs Minister rather than the Prime Minister, and the meeting's lasting significance was not the declaration but the bilateral on its margins, which fed directly into the October 2024 disengagement on the LAC. At Tianjin in September 2025 the Prime Minister went in person, met President Xi on Chinese soil for the first time since before Galwan, and signed a heads-of-state text that named the Pahalgam attack. Bishkek in September 2026 then restated India's two standing positions, terrorism without double standards and connectivity that respects sovereignty, in the organisation's anniversary year. For Mains, this is the cleanest available case study of a country managing a hostile bilateral inside a multilateral forum rather than despite it.

The counter-example in the same period is as instructive. At the Defence Ministers' meeting in Qingdao in June 2025, weeks after Operation Sindoor, India refused to let a terrorism text that omitted Pahalgam pass, and the meeting produced no joint statement at all. Read Qingdao and Tianjin together and the mechanism becomes visible: the SCO decides by consensus, Pakistan cannot be suspended under the Charter, and India's only instrument is therefore its veto over language. It used that instrument to block in June and did not need it in September. The same refusal governs connectivity, where India continues to stand outside the paragraph endorsing the Belt and Road Initiative while signing everything else.

The organisation itself grew heavier in this window without becoming decisively stronger. Belarus joined at Astana, a year after Iran, so the membership now stretches from Europe to West Asia and imports quarrels that have little to do with Eurasian security; the Foreign Ministers' statement of July 2026 obliged India to sit with SCO language on West Asia that it must weigh against its own ties there. Tianjin decided on new security centres, a development bank and a single partner category, and Bishkek approved provisions for two of the centres and a protocol amending the Charter. What none of it has yet produced is an institution actually in operation: the bank remains a decision by interested members, the new partner status waits on Charter amendments, and the protocol's contents have not been published, so how far the Organisation's working rules have changed cannot yet be judged.

The tiers also matter more than they used to, and are a standing Prelims trap. The heads-of-state summit rotates with the chairmanship, while the heads-of-government council meets separately, in another country, on trade and the budget — Moscow in November 2025, Tajikistan in 2026 — and India has been represented at that tier by its External Affairs Minister. An aspirant who reads every SCO decision as a summit decision will attribute outcomes to the wrong body and the wrong year.

The year ahead is the test India has not faced before. The chair passed at Bishkek to Pakistan, whose theme is built on the very word, connectivity, over which India contests the most, and whose chair year contains the next summit. India's level of attendance at Pakistan-hosted meetings will be read as a signal, much as India's own choice of a virtual format in 2023 was read as one; the inaugural session of the Civilisation Dialogue Forum that India has proposed to hold at home is the counterweight to watch.

PYQ Relevance

• (Prelims 2022): "Which of the following is the headquarters of the RATS of the SCO?" — Tashkent
• (Prelims 2019): "The 'Shanghai Spirit' represents which of the following principles?" — mutual trust, equality, non-targeting of third parties
• (GS2 Mains 2021): "How does India's membership in the SCO contribute to its foreign policy objectives? Discuss the challenges India faces within the SCO."
• (GS2 Mains 2023): "The SCO presents India with both opportunities and contradictions. Elaborate."

Exam Strategy

Non-negotiable Prelims facts:

• SCO founded: 15 June 2001 (Shanghai Five from 26 April 1996)
• Secretariat: Beijing; RATS: Tashkent
• India and Pakistan joined: June 2017 (Astana Summit)
• Iran joined: 2023 (India's Presidency); Belarus: July 2024 (Astana) → 10 total members
• Charter signed: 7 June 2002 in St. Petersburg; in force: 19 September 2003
• "Three Evils": terrorism, separatism, extremism
• Dialogue Partners: 15 (Laos added at Tianjin, 1 Sep 2025); a single "SCO Partner" status is to replace Observer and Dialogue Partner once Charter amendments enter into force
• Secretary-General: Nurlan Yermekbayev (Kazakhstan), in office from January 2025
• 24th Summit: Astana, July 3–4 2024 (Jaishankar represented India)
• 25th Summit: Tianjin, 1 Sep 2025 (China chair); 24 documents incl. Development Strategy until 2035; Tianjin Declaration condemned Pahalgam attack; "relevant member states" decided to establish an SCO Development Bank (China's 2 billion yuan grants and 10 billion yuan Interbank Consortium loans are separate pledges); Modi-Xi first bilateral on Chinese soil in nearly 7 years
• 26th Summit: Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 1 Sep 2026 (held; Kyrgyz chair 2025–26); 28 documents incl. Bishkek Declaration and Charter amendment protocol
• 27th Summit: in Pakistan's chair year (2026–27); city and date not yet announced by the SCO

Mains analytical angles:

• SCO as India's paradox: valuable for Central Asia access and great-power engagement, yet India's core concerns (CPEC, cross-border terrorism) are structurally blocked by China-Pakistan solidarity
• India-China within SCO: bilateral tensions co-exist with multilateral cooperation — 2025 Tianjin reset as a case study in managed competition
• SCO's "Shanghai Spirit" vs. India's democratic values: can India shape SCO's normative agenda?
• Connectivity within SCO: India's absence from BRI-aligned projects limits its gains; INSTC as the alternative
• Afghanistan factor: SCO's security mandate undermined by Taliban control; Pakistan-Afghanistan nexus complicates RATS

Cross-link: For current SCO summit developments and India's multilateral diplomacy, follow Ujiyari.com.

Key Terms

SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation)

• Definition: The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is a permanent intergovernmental regional grouping established in June 2001 to promote political, economic and security cooperation across Eurasia, with a primary focus on combating the "three evils" of terrorism, separatism and extremism. It is the world's largest regional organisation by geographic area and population, and India has been a full member since 2017.
• Context: The SCO grew out of the "Shanghai Five" mechanism formed in 1996 by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to settle border disputes; Uzbekistan joined in 2001 to formally create the SCO. Its Charter was signed in 2002 and entered into force in 2003, giving it international legal personality. The organisation has two permanent bodies — the Secretariat in Beijing and the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) in Tashkent. India joined as a full member at the 2017 Astana summit, having earlier held observer status from 2005.
• UPSC Relevance: SCO is a foundational concept for GS2 (India and its neighbourhood, bilateral/regional/global groupings involving India and affecting India's interests) and frequently appears in Prelims through factual recall of members, observers, permanent bodies (RATS) and headquarters. For Mains, it underpins answers on India's "multi-alignment"/strategic autonomy, Eurasian connectivity, counter-terrorism diplomacy, and India's balancing act among China, Russia, Pakistan and Iran within a single forum. Aspirants should track each annual summit's outcomes and India's specific positions (terrorism, connectivity, sovereignty).

Sources & Verification

Summits and SCO decisions

• SCO Secretariat — 25th meeting of the Council of Heads of State, Tianjin (1 Sep 2025)
• Tianjin Declaration of the SCO Council of Heads of State, full-text English translation (2 Sep 2025)
• Government of China (Xinhua) — "Xi calls for forging ahead with solid steps as SCO convenes largest-ever summit" (1 Sep 2025)
• PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs — readout, "President Xi Jinping Chairs the 'SCO Plus' Meeting" (2 Sep 2025)
• SCO Secretariat — 24th meeting of the Council of Heads of Government, Moscow (18 Nov 2025)
• SCO Secretariat — Observers, dialogue partners and the "SCO Partner" status (accessed 22 Sep 2026)
• SCO Secretariat — Statement of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Cholpon-Ata (24 Jul 2026)
• SCO Secretariat — 26th meeting of the Council of Heads of State, Bishkek (1 Sep 2026)
• China MFA — Reception on Nurlan Yermekbayev's assumption of office as SCO Secretary-General (reception 17 Jan 2025; page updated 18 Jan 2025)

India in the SCO

• Euronews (AP) — India rejects SCO Defence Ministers' statement, Qingdao (26 Jun 2025)
• All India Radio — SCO joint statement dropped as India registers strong objections on omission of terrorism concerns (26 Jun 2025)
• MEA — Foreign Secretary's special briefing on the PM's meeting with President Xi, Tianjin (31 Aug 2025; transcript mirror)
• All India Radio — No place for double standards on terrorism: PM Modi at SCO meeting in Bishkek (1 Sep 2026)