Practice: The Integration of Rajasthan

(b) 18 March 1948. Comprising Alwar, Bharatpur, Dholpur and Karauli; 7,536 sq miles, population over 1.8 million.

Why not the others: March 1948 has two inaugurations eight days apart — Matsya on the 18th and the Rajasthan Union on the 25th — and they are different unions of different states.

(c) Nine. Banswara (with Kushalgarh), Bundi, Dungarpur, Jhalawar, Kishengarh, Kotah, Partabgarh, Shahpura and Tonk; 16,807 sq miles.

Why not the others: (a) four is the Matsya Union's count and also the number that joined in 1949. Three different fours and one nine.

(d) Their natural affinity was found to be more with Rajputana. The White Paper says they "formed a contiguous area with ethnic, linguistic and cultural affinities".

Why not the others: The phrasing is the government's own reasoning, and is quoted as such rather than as settled fact — how a state decides where a region's affinity lies is itself a question.

(a) The Maharana of Mewar. The Maharao of Kotah was senior Up-Rajpramukh. It was inaugurated by Jawaharlal Nehru.

Why not the others: (b) is the trap: Jaipur becomes first Rajpramukh in 1949, when Mewar moves to Maharajpramukh. The same house holds two different titles a year apart.

(b) Rs 1 million, plus Rs 500,000 as Rajpramukh and Rs 500,000 for charitable and religious purposes. Granted because, in the White Paper's words, Mewar "was in a position to stand by itself" and its resources "would greatly add to the strength of the Union".

Why not the others: A state that could survive alone had to be paid to join, and the integrating government says so itself. That is a more honest account than either patriotic accession or coercion.

(c) The Ruler of Jaipur. The Ruler of Mewar became Maharajpramukh for life — an office the White Paper says was made to "ensure for the Ruler of this important State an honourable place in the new set-up".

Why not the others: A face-saving title to move Mewar aside for Jaipur, described almost in those terms by its creators.

(d) Jaipur, Jodhpur, Bikaner and Jaisalmer. 120,888 sq miles, population 11.2 million, inaugurated 30 March 1949.

Why not the others: (a) is Matsya, (c) the Mewar Residency grouping. Each option is a real four-state cluster from this chapter.

(a) Merger with the United Provinces. Alwar and Karauli were unanimous for Rajasthan; the other two were not.

Why not the others: (c) Bombay is Sirohi's alternative, which is a different case in the same chapter. Two districts of Rajasthan nearly went to the UP.

(b) Shankar Rao Deo. Sidhwa and Himatsingka were the members. It worked by questionnaires and public meetings.

Why not the others: (d) G. C. Trench headed the Begun commission of 1923, in the peasant-movements chapter — a different commission, twenty-six years earlier.

(c) A possible later plebiscite in Bharatpur and Dholpur. The committee "was not sure if the opinion elicited by it would remain stabilised", and recommended a later plebiscite or other appropriate procedure.

Why not the others: Two districts entered Rajasthan with a plebiscite clause hanging over them, recorded in the Government's own White Paper. It is the most striking fact in the chapter.

(d) Partitioned, with Abu Road tehsil and part of Delwara to Bombay and the rest to Rajasthan. Bombay had taken over its administration on behalf of the Government of India with effect from 5 January 1949, under an agreement signed by the Regent Maharani for the minor Ruler.

Why not the others: (a) is the standard error. Sirohi is the state that was divided between two successors, and Abu's later movement follows from that partition.

(a) Three stages. Exam material generally counts seven, adding Matsya's own formation and merger, statehood in 1950 and the 1956 reorganisation.

Why not the others: Neither count is wrong; they count different things. The White Paper counts how the Rajasthan union was built; the seven-stage scheme counts every constitutional event. Learn the events and dates, not the total.

(b) 17 March 1948, inaugurated by Minister N. V. Gadgil — the date given by both the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly's own statement of the seven stages and the board textbook.

Why not the others: (a) is the answer this site itself carried until 21 August 2026, and the correction is logged on the parent chapter. 18 March 1948 is the date Bharatpur state merged into the Matsya Union, one day after the Union was inaugurated — a member's accession date had been used for the Union's formation date. (c) 25 March is the Rajasthan Union; (d) 18 April is the United State of Rajasthan. Knowing what 18 March actually belongs to is what stops the error recurring.

(c) The Sironj sub-district of Jhalawar, transferred to Madhya Pradesh on 1 November 1956.

Why not the others: This is the fact most notes omit, and it is a loss rather than a gain. An answer that lists Ajmer, Abu Road and Sunel Tappa without Sironj has described the reorganisation as purely additive, which it was not — which is exactly what (a) invites you to do. (b) confuses this with stage 6, where the eighteen states merged with Sirohi, except Abu and Delwara, on 26 January 1950.

(d). States Department policy was that no ruler receive a Privy Purse above 10 lakh rupees a year; the Maharana demanded 20; and he also got Rajpramukh of United Rajasthan for life. The board's own comment is that no such concessions had been given to the ruler of any other princely state.

Why not the others: That table is the whole politics of integration in one place. A ceiling of ten lakhs was honoured in the letter and doubled in substance by relabelling the excess as an office allowance and a religious grant. Mewar's antiquity bought terms nobody else got, and the board says so plainly. Note also why the Maharana moved: after the firing in Mewar on 5 April he concluded that merger was the only way to be rid of the Praja Mandal.

(a) Maharawal Chandravir Singh of Banswara, who hesitated to sign and was persuaded by neighbouring rulers.

Why not the others: (b) The Maharao of Kota has his own moment in the same episode: when V. P. Menon advised him to halt the inauguration until Mewar was settled, he replied that the preparations were complete and the invitations sent, so the ceremony must go ahead — and the States Department accepted his argument. On 25 March 1948, N. V. Gadgil opened the Rajasthan Union at Kota, swearing in the Maharao of Kota as Rajpramukh and Gokul Lal Asawa as Prime Minister.

(b). The Maharaja of Karauli was Deputy Rajpramukh, which is what makes (a) work. Shobharam Kumawat was the prominent leader of the Alwar Praja Mandal.

Why not the others: (c) The Maharaja of Alwar could not have held the office — he had been detained in Delhi. The Government of India received complaints that the Alwar administration itself was involved in instigating communal riots, and on 7 February it detained the Maharaja and Dr Khare in Delhi and took over Alwar's administration. In Bharatpur, the administration having proved utterly inefficient in maintaining law and order, the Maharaja handed it over to the Government of India before it could act, while Dholpur and Karauli were too small to maintain separate existence. These two states did not resist integration and get absorbed; their administrations collapsed or were seized over communal violence, and integration followed.

(a) R explains A. Integration is the bill for the settlement of 1818, and the Praja Mandals' state-by-state structure was the same cost paid earlier.

(d) R is true and A false. In 1949 Mewar became Maharajpramukh and Jaipur the first Rajpramukh. The 1948 fact is being applied to the 1949 union.

(a) R is the government's own stated reason for A. A state that could survive alone had to be paid to join.

(a) R is the evidence for A, and both halves come from the White Paper itself.

(d) R is true, but A is false: the White Paper itself says three, counting how the Rajasthan union was built. Neither count is mistaken; they count different things, which is why the events and dates are the safe thing to learn.

(a) The Matsya integration agreement follows on 15 May 1949, with administration transferred from that date.

(a) A and C are the same house a year apart under different titles, which is exactly what the question is built on.

(a) C signed for the minor Ruler, with effect from 5 January 1949.

(c) 19 salute states and 3 non-salute states, with Ajmer-Merwara alongside. V. P. Menon states the composition exactly, and the White Paper's statement of privy purses lists twenty-two entries under the heading States constituting Rajasthan. 19 + 3 + 1.

Why not the others: Ajmer-Merwara was British Indian territory, not a princely state — which is why it could not be covenanted in and had to be brought in by statute in 1956. The twenty-two of the White Paper's list is 19 salute plus 3 non-salute, and Sirohi is one of the nineteen.

(d) Lawa, Kushalgarh and Nimrana. They carry the three smallest privy purses on the White Paper's page — Rs 12,500, Rs 34,775 and Rs 15,000 — which is how they can be named at all.

Why not the others: Shahpura (Rs 90,000) and Partabgarh (Rs 1,02,000) are salute states of the first Rajasthan Union, and Sirohi (Rs 2,12,600) is a salute state whose territory was later split. Two of these three matter twice over: Kushalgarh is why the first union is sometimes counted as ten units rather than nine, since the White Paper writes the founding group as "Banswara (including Kushalgarh)"; and Nimrana held its own separate purse as a unit of Rajasthan, which is why calling it a fifth member of the Matsya covenant does not survive the instruments.

(a) Individual representation on the Constituent Assembly of India. The White Paper puts it in one line, and that representation had been settled on population: 16 states of over one million people, plus 4 of between 750,000 and one million — twenty in all. Dholpur and Karauli failed it; Jaipur, Jodhpur and Bikaner passed it, which is exactly why they had to be persuaded rather than absorbed.

Why not the others: (b) is the version that circulates, usually attached to Patel's statement of 5 July 1947. That statement set no threshold of any kind. The test was population expressed through Constituent Assembly seats, and nothing else — which is also why Menon could write of the four states still outside in 1949 that "except for Jaisalmer, all of them were viable units according to the standards laid down by the Government of India."

(b) Defence, External Affairs and Communications — three subjects, and no more. The accession it invited "did not imply any financial liability" and left internal sovereignty untouched. Mountbatten advised the same three subjects to the Chamber of Princes on 25 July 1947, and by 15 August 1947, "barring Hyderabad, Kashmir and Junagadh, all the States in the geographical limits of India had acceded".

Why not the others: (a) Finance is the giveaway — accession carried no financial liability at all. Accession in 1947 and integration in 1948-49 are two different processes, and running them together is the commonest structural error in an answer on this topic: the states that acceded in 1947 kept their internal sovereignty, and had to be merged separately afterwards.

(c) The Maharao of Kotah, "as early as 1946, after the Cabinet Mission plan had been announced". Its conclusion was the rulers' own verdict on themselves: their states "were vulnerable at many points", "had no kind of future", and "only by pooling their sovereignties could they survive". It failed, and when the first Rajasthan Union was proposed in March 1948 the initiative again came from Kotah, Dungarpur and Jhalawar, not from Delhi.

Why not the others: (d) The States Department did not exist in 1946 — it was announced on 27 June 1947 and came into being on 5 July 1947. (a) is the version aggregators carry, with a date, a legal adviser and an attendance of twenty-two rulers; none of that is in either primary account, which records a conference of ministers, not of rulers. The point survives either way and is worth a Mains line: for the small south-eastern states, integration was closer to something they had been trying and failing to do for two years. The Maharaj Rana of Jhalawar, whose state ran to 813 square miles, wanted to hand it over outright and later joined the Indian Foreign Service.

(d) 28 February 1948. All four signed together, the day after being invited to Delhi on 27 February and having the Union put to them.

Why not the others: (a) is the meeting, not the signature, and the two are one day apart. (b) is an inauguration date, not an accession: there is no separate Bharatpur accession in March 1948 in either primary record — the four states signed as one and the Union was inaugurated as a whole. (c) 25 March belongs to the first Rajasthan Union. The commonest trap here is not the wrong month but the wrong kind of event — a covenant signature offered as an inauguration.

(a) 18 March 1948. The two Government of India primary sources agree: "The Matsya Union, which was inaugurated on 18th March 1948" (White Paper), and "The Union was inaugurated on 18 March by N. V. Gadgil" (Menon, who convened the rulers).

Why not the others: (b) 17 March 1948 is what two Government of Rajasthan sources give — the Legislative Assembly's statement of the seven stages and the Board of Secondary Education's textbook. The date is not settled, and a Rajasthan-set paper is likelier to key on the state material, so the safe position is to know which source says which. One arithmetical test cuts the other way: the duration that circulates in exam material, 8 years 7 months 14 days to the reorganisation of 1 November 1956, is exact only from 18 March; from 17 March the interval is 8 years 7 months 15 days. (c) is the covenant signature and (d) the first Rajasthan Union.

(b) K. M. Munshi, on the ground that Matsya "was the old name of this region to be found in the ancient books and in the Mahabharata".

Why not the others: (c) Gadgil inaugurated the Union, as Minister for Works, Mines and Power — the portfolio is worth carrying, because it is asked. (a) Menon convened the rulers and drafted the covenant, and it was to him that Munshi made the suggestion.

(a) R is the stated reason for A, given by the man who arranged it. Alwar, or failing him Bharatpur, "should have been Rajpramukh"; both were asked to stand down in favour of Dholpur, "who was in any case the oldest of the four rulers". Bharatpur agreed readily, Alwar "acquiesced only after a good deal of argument and reluctance". Both were later exonerated, which makes Dholpur's Rajpramukhship the residue of a charge that did not stand.

(c) Communal tension and the assassination allegations. Menon served the order personally on Maharaja Tej Singh on 7 February 1948; the Maharaja and Dr N. B. Khare were required to remain in Delhi. The enquiries ended in exoneration — of the Maharaja of Alwar, of Dr Khare, and, on similar allegations, of the Maharaja of Bharatpur, who was "completely exonerated".

Why not the others: (a) is the state textbook's ground standing alone; the assassination allegation is the half it leaves out, and it is the half that explains the speed. (d) reverses the sequence — accession was substantially complete by August 1947, and these were takeovers of administration, not refusals to accede. A 14 February 1948 date for the Bharatpur takeover, with a named Administrator and Commander-in-Chief, is carried by coaching material only: the primary account gives the takeover and its cause but no date and no names. Menon's own verdict is the Mains line here: the action "may appear in retrospect… unduly drastic", yet had "a very steadying effect on the communal situation".

(d) The Maharawal of Dungarpur. The covenant deemed the rulers of Kotah, Bundi and Dungarpur elected as Rajpramukh, Senior Up-Rajpramukh and Junior Up-Rajpramukh respectively.

Why not the others: (c) is the standing omission — the Junior Up-Rajpramukhship exists from the first union onward and is left out of most notes. (a) Bundi was Senior, not Junior. Kotah is the state to watch: Rajpramukh of the first union, relieved of it when Mewar joined, and made Senior Up-Rajpramukh by way of compensation in both later unions. Three offices in twelve months.

(a) Udaipur, with guarantees to Kotah. Mewar's Dewan S. V. Ramamurthy asked for the capital and got it; the Maharao of Kotah, who had given up the Rajpramukhship, argued that he should not be "relegated to an unimportant position", and was paid in kind: at least one legislature session a year at Kotah, the Kotah State Forces to stay there, the Forest School, the Police Training College and the Aeronautical College, and one Commissioner's division headquarters.

Why not the others: (c) Jaipur becomes the capital in 1949, on the recommendation of the P. Satyanarayan Rao Committee. That 1949 scattering of departments among Jodhpur, Bikaner, Udaipur, Kota and Bharatpur was not an improvisation: the same compensation had already been paid once, to Kotah, a year earlier. (b) and (d) are the capitals aggregators give for the first Rajasthan Union and the Matsya Union, and neither primary source names a capital for either of those two unions — carry them, if at all, as what the aggregators say.

(b) The Maharana's decision officially reached the States Ministry — three days after the first union's inauguration. Discussions with Ramamurthy began that day and continued on 29 March; Patel received the Maharana's letter of consent on 1 April, and it refers to "the discussions held in Delhi on the 28th and the 29th of March".

Why not the others: (a) 11 April, when the covenant was approved and signed by all the rulers present; (c) 18 April, when Nehru inaugurated the Union; (d) 25 March. This is why two Government of Rajasthan sources give different dates for the same stage — one is dating the decision and the other the ceremony, and both events are real.

(c) 29,977 square miles, with a population of 42,60,918 and an annual revenue of Rs 316 lakhs. The covenant was signed on 11 April and Nehru inaugurated the Union on 18 April 1948.

Why not the others: (a) 29,777 is a digit lost in transmission, and it travels widely alongside the population figure, which the same notes reproduce correctly. (b) 16,807 is the first Rajasthan Union before Mewar joined; (d) 120,888 is the United State of Rajasthan of 30 March 1949. Udaipur roughly doubled the union's population and added about 13,000 square miles, which is the quickest way to remember which figure belongs where.

(d) Jaipur, Rs 18,00,000. Then Jodhpur Rs 17,50,000, Bikaner Rs 17,00,000, and Mewar Rs 10,00,000 in fourth place. The total for all twenty-two units of Rajasthan was Rs 1,01,42,875 a year.

Why not the others: (a) Mewar as the largest is the claim that circulates, and it is fourth. Mewar's terms were exceptional in what was bolted on to the purse, not in the purse itself: two allowances of five lakhs each and a life office. Antiquity bought titles; population bought money. Note also that Alwar (Rs 5,20,000) and Bharatpur (Rs 5,02,000) are the fifth and sixth largest, far above Dholpur (Rs 2,64,000) and Karauli (Rs 1,05,000) — the Matsya Union was two substantial states and two that could not stand alone.

(a) Rs 1,80,000, in the Schedule to the Covenant and again in the White Paper's statement of privy purses.

Why not the others: (b) Rs 2.80 lakh is the figure that circulates for Jaisalmer, and it belongs to nobody — it is a rounding of (c) Rs 2,78,000, which is Tonk's. (d) Rs 2,12,600 is Sirohi's, the state a portion of which merged in Bombay. Jaisalmer is also the one state among the four that came in during 1949 that Menon does not count as a viable unit by the Government's own test.

(a) Article XI provides that those sums "shall be payable only to the present Rulers", each successor being entitled to "Rs ten lakhs". Eighteen, seventeen and a half and seventeen lakhs were one-generation exceptions to a ten-lakh rule. The benchmark for them was argued from outside Rajasthan altogether: the popular leaders put the three states "more or less on a par with Indore", whose ruler had Rs 15 lakhs plus Rs 2.5 lakhs as Up-Rajpramukh, and it was those leaders, not the rulers, who proposed Rs 17.5 lakhs each.

(b) The Rajpramukhship alone was for life. Sawai Man Singh II of Jaipur was President of the Council of Rulers, that is Rajpramukh, for life; Jodhpur (Hanwant Singh) and Kotah were Senior Vice-Presidents, and Bundi and Dungarpur Junior Vice-Presidents, all four for five years. Bhupal Singh of Mewar was Maharajpramukh for life, and that office ended with him, its allowances being personal to him.

Why not the others: (a) is the assumption that makes the end of these offices look like a lapse. They were creatures of a covenant between rulers, with their terms written into the instrument, and two of the four ran on a clock from the start.

(c) 7 April 1949. Patel inaugurated Greater Rajasthan at Jaipur on 30 March 1949 "by swearing in the Rajpramukh and the Premier"; the Covenant then required the Rajpramukh of the former Rajasthan State to hand over the administration on 7 April, and each new covenanting ruler not later than that date.

Why not the others: (a) 30 March is the inauguration, and is kept as Rajasthan Day; 7 April is the day the state actually took over the territory. (b) is Patel's announcement at Udaipur that Jodhpur, Jaipur and Bikaner had accepted merger; (d) the Delhi meeting that settled Sawai Man Singh as Rajpramukh for life and Bhupal Singh as Maharajpramukh. A decision, a ceremony and a handover, all within eleven weeks, and all askable.

(d) The Maharajkumar of Jaisalmer's condition, which Menon calls "a bombshell". Hanwant Singh had taken him along precisely because he did not want to go alone; theirs were the three states geographically contiguous to Pakistan. Mountbatten then told the Maharaja that there was no legal objection to Jodhpur acceding to Pakistan but that he should weigh the consequences, and Hanwant Singh signed the Instrument of Accession — after which, Menon records, the Maharaja levelled a revolver at him.

Why not the others: (a) Bikaner's refusal to accompany him is why Jaisalmer was brought along, not why the talks failed. (b) Mountbatten argued the consequences rather than prohibiting anything. This episode is what makes the strategic case for Greater Rajasthan concrete: one of the three border rulers had negotiated with Jinnah, and the Government of India knew it.

(a) A Chief Commissioner's province, so that "practically the whole frontier with Pakistan would be under the direct control of the Government of India". The reasoning was that the boundary was "in sections, both unnatural and arbitrary", and that guarding it would be "a great strain" on Rajasthan's resources. Menon's verdict on his own scheme: it "had more enemies than friends", and he gave it up "not without great regret".

Why not the others: The alternative to Greater Rajasthan was never independence for Jodhpur; it was a border province run from Delhi. The same idea returned in 1955 as Maru Pradesh and was refused by the States Reorganisation Commission on the reasoning turned around: such a state could not "police a seven-hundred mile frontier" and would be "a weak unit", the major portion of it "an unreclaimed desert". The border and the desert that brought these states into Rajasthan in 1949 kept them there in 1955.

(b) The Gaekwar of Baroda, on the evidence of the Secretary who ran the process: "Sir Pratap Singh, Gaekwar of Baroda, was the first ruler actually to sign the Instrument of Accession."

Why not the others: (a) is the claim that circulates in Rajasthan material, and it does not hold for the all-India title. Bikaner's Sadul Singh gave the patriotic lead to other rulers, which is a different claim and a true one. Whether Bikaner was first among the Rajputana states, and whether the date was 7 August 1947, is not established from any primary source — a claim to recognise rather than to assert. (c) confuses signature with announcement: the first announcement of accession came from the Dewan of Gwalior, not from its ruler and not as a signature.

(c) Appointed 4 April 1949; press communiqué 1 May 1949. Its three members were Members of Parliament, instructed "to report before the end of the month", and they toured the two states. Twenty-seven days from appointment to public decision.

Why not the others: (a) 23 March 1949 is the meeting at which the two rulers stated their positions, and it matters: Bharatpur said the majority of his people favoured Rajasthan, while Dholpur agreed with the proviso that his state should go to the United Provinces later if the majority so desired. That proviso is Article V, written up. (b) and (d) belong to the agreement and the handover. The finding proved durable out of all proportion to its speed: the States Reorganisation Commission refused in 1955 to move Alwar and Bharatpur into a proposed Greater Delhi or Brij Pradesh, on the ground that opinion had not appreciably changed since the committee went into the question.

(d) 10 May 1949. The instrument opens "AGREEMENT made this tenth day of May, 1949", and the four Matsya rulers signed it with the Rajpramukh of Rajasthan at a conference in Delhi that day. Article II then transfers the administration "as from mid-day of the 15th day of May, 1949".

Why not the others: (a) 15 May is the handover, five days later, and it is the date most often printed for the instrument itself — an event of one kind used as the date of an event of another, the same error that clouds the Matsya inauguration. (b) is the press communiqué announcing the Government's acceptance of the committee's finding. It was at the 10 May conference that the Maharaja of Bharatpur asked whether rulers who opted out later would be treated differently from the other covenanting rulers, and was told they would not.

(a) 8 November 1948, when the Maharani Regent signed an agreement on behalf of the minor Ruler and the state became centrally administered. The advice to take that course came from Gokulbhai Bhatt, who was at once adviser to the Dowager Maharani and President of the Rajasthan Provincial Congress Committee, and who thought a decision either way "inopportune".

Why not the others: (b) 5 January 1949 is when the state was handed to the Government of Bombay to administer on behalf of the Government of India — two months later, and the date usually given as the start of the story. (c) 25 January 1950 is the States' Merger (Bombay) Order, 1950 coming into force, which carved out Abu Road tehsil and named villages of Delwara; (d) 19 March 1948 is the day the Gujarat States agreed to merge with Bombay, which is what left Sirohi alone. The succession dispute behind all of it went to the Divatia Committee, appointed 10 March 1949.

(b) Local feeling and the 65 per cent Rajasthani mother-tongue finding. The Commission recorded that the decision to break up Sirohi "has not been welcomed either in Gujarat or in Rajasthan", and that it had "reluctantly been compelled to recommend a review of the decision taken in 1950". Abu Road taluka came back on 1 November 1956, into Sirohi district, so Sirohi reached Rajasthan in two stages six years apart.

Why not the others: (a) was Gujarat's case for keeping Abu, with the argument that Mount Abu had been traditionally associated with Gujarati culture; (d) was one of Rajasthan's own arguments in the original controversy, not a ground the Commission adopted. (c) no plebiscite was ever held — 1952 is when the Government of India decided to reopen the question and set in motion the process contemplated in Article 3 of the Constitution. The sharpest Mains point here is that the language statistic that undid the partition in 1956 was one nobody had thought to collect when the partition was made.

(c) Kotah district. The States Reorganisation Act, 1956 says so twice — in section 9(1)(b) and again in section 10(1)(c), "Sironj sub-division of Kotah district in the existing State of Rajasthan" — and places it in Bhilsa district of the new Madhya Pradesh.

Why not the others: (a) Jhalawar is the version most notes carry, and Jhalawar's 1956 change was a gain, not a loss: Sunel tappa of Bhanpura tahsil, Mandsaur district, was placed in Jhalawar district. The loss from Kotah and the gain to Jhalawar have been run together into one wrong sentence. The rest of section 10 brings in Ajmer, which becomes Ajmer district, and Abu Road taluka from Banaskantha, which goes into Sirohi district. The Commission had also recommended the Loharu sub-tehsil of Hissar for Rajasthan; Parliament did not enact it, and Loharu is in Haryana today — the cheapest demonstration in this syllabus that a recommendation is not a transfer.

(d) It was abolished by the Seventh Amendment. Part VII and Article 238 had applied the provisions of Part VI to the Part B States with the word Rajpramukh standing in place of Governor; deleting them removed the constitutional basis of the office, and of the Up-Rajpramukhs and the Maharajpramukh with it. Sawai Man Singh was Rajpramukh from 30 March 1949 to 31 October 1956, the whole life of the office in this state; Gurumukh Nihal Singh, appointed 25 October 1956, was Governor from 1 November 1956 to 15 April 1962.

Why not the others: (a) abolished, not lapsed — the distinction matters, because all four covenant offices went in a single day. (b) five years was the Up-Rajpramukhs' term, not the Rajpramukh's, which was for life. (c) separates the two instruments: the States Reorganisation Act moved territory, while the constitutional amendment ended the office and the Part B category itself. Rajasthan had begun as one of eight Part B States at the commencement of the Constitution, alongside nine Part A and ten Part C States, Ajmer next door being "a one-district Part C State surrounded on all sides by territories of Rajasthan".