Governor — Discretionary Powers, Role & Controversies

Cross-paper relevance

• GS2 — Core: Article 153–162 (Governor's constitutional position), Article 163 (discretionary powers, Council of Ministers), Article 200–201 (Governor's assent to bills — all three Art 200 options discretionary per November 2025 Advisory), Article 356 (President's Rule on Governor's report), Sarkaria and Punchhi Commission recommendations, landmark SC rulings (Shamsher Singh 1974, Bommai 1994, Nabam Rebia 2016, TN Governor April 2025, Presidential Reference Advisory 20 November 2025 — 2025 INSC 1333)
• GS3 — Centre-State dimension: Governor as Centre's agent vs constitutional head; PESA and tribal area governance; Article 371 special provisions (Governors' special responsibilities in NE states)
• GS4 — Ethics: impartiality and constitutional morality of Governors; misuse of discretionary power as an institutional integrity issue; accountability without justiciability
• Essay — Recurring themes: "The Governor — constitutional head or partisan agent?"; "Cooperative federalism and the role of the Governor"; "Centre-State relations in India — cooperative or coercive?"

Constitutional Position of the Governor

The Governor is the constitutional head of a state, as provided under Article 153 of the Constitution. Each state shall have a Governor, though a single person can be appointed Governor of two or more states (Article 153, proviso added by 7th Amendment 1956).

The Governor is appointed by the President under his hand and seal (Article 155) and holds office during the pleasure of the President (Article 156). The normal term is five years, but no security of tenure is constitutionally guaranteed.

Key Articles (Part VI: Articles 153–167)

Article 163 — Aid and Advice vs Discretion

Article 163(1): There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the head to aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions, except in so far as he is by or under this Constitution required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion.

Article 163(2): If any question arises whether any matter is or is not a matter as respects which the Governor is by or under this Constitution required to act in his discretion, the decision of the Governor in his discretion shall be final, and the validity of anything done by the Governor shall not be called in question on the ground that he ought or ought not to have acted in his discretion.

Article 163(3): The question whether any, and if so what, advice was tendered by Ministers to the Governor shall not be inquired into in any court.

Nature of Discretionary Powers

The Governor's discretionary powers are of two types:

Constitutional Discretion — explicitly provided by the Constitution:

• Acting on bills — assenting, returning, or reserving for President (Article 200) — all three options are the Governor's discretion; the Governor is NOT bound by the Council of Ministers' advice when choosing among these options (Presidential Reference Advisory, 20 November 2025, 2025 INSC 1333 — a significant expansion over pre-2025 understanding)
• Recommending President's Rule (Article 356)
• Seeking information from Chief Minister (Article 167)
• Dissolving the state assembly in certain situations
• Appointing Chief Minister when no party has a clear majority

Situational Discretion — arising from political circumstances:

• Determining which party leader should be invited to form government after a hung assembly
• Ordering a floor test
• Deciding the time allowed to form a government

Power Over Bills: Articles 200 & 201

Under Article 200, when a Bill is passed by the state legislature, the Governor has three options (all three are discretionary — Governor not bound by CoM advice per November 2025 Advisory):

1. Give assent to the bill
2. Withhold assent and return it to the legislature with a message (suspensive veto — not absolute)
3. Reserve the bill for the President's consideration

Money Bill exception: For Money Bills, the Governor can only give assent or reserve for the President — he cannot return a Money Bill to the legislature for reconsideration.

If the legislature passes the bill again (with or without amendments), the Governor must give assent per the constitutional text — he cannot withhold assent a second time. This means the Governor has only a suspensive veto, not an absolute veto.

Under Article 201, when a bill is reserved for the President, the President may:

• Give assent
• Withhold assent
• Direct the Governor to return the bill to the legislature for reconsideration

Key rule (post-November 2025 Advisory Opinion): There is no constitutional time limit under Article 200 for the Governor to act on a bill, and courts cannot impose specific timelines (Presidential Reference Advisory, 20 November 2025). However, "prolonged, unexplained, indefinite inaction" will attract limited judicial scrutiny (mandamus to act — not deemed assent). The Governor is not bound by CoM advice when choosing among the three options under Article 200.

Article 213 — Governor's Ordinance Power

Parallel to the President's Article 123 power, the Governor can promulgate ordinances when the State Legislature is not in session and circumstances require immediate action.

2022 GS2 Mains directly tested this: "Discuss the essential conditions for exercise of the legislative powers by the Governor and the legality of re-promulgation of ordinances by the Governor without placing them before the Legislature."

Swearing-in & Floor Test Controversies

A politically charged discretionary situation arises when the Governor must decide:

• Who to invite to form the government after a hung assembly result
• Whether to order a floor test before or after swearing in

The Governor's actions in these situations have been controversial in multiple states. The general constitutional convention — reinforced by Supreme Court rulings — is:

• The largest party/pre-poll alliance with a reasonable claim must be invited first
• The floor test must be held promptly — within a short period (days, not weeks)
• The Governor cannot favour any political party or delay the process

Landmark Supreme Court Cases

1. Nabam Rebia & Bamang Felix v. Deputy Speaker (2016) — Arunachal Pradesh

A five-judge Constitution Bench (Justices J.S. Khehar, Dipak Misra, M.B. Lokur, P.C. Ghose and N.V. Ramana) delivered this landmark ruling on 13 July 2016.

Background: The Arunachal Pradesh Governor summoned an early assembly session (advancing the date by a month) without consulting the Chief Minister, causing a political crisis. President's Rule was subsequently imposed.

Ruling:

• The Governor's power to summon the House under Article 174 must be exercised on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, not at his own discretion
• The Governor cannot unilaterally summon, prorogue, or advance the date of a legislative session
• The Governor's discretion does not extend to the exercise of powers under Article 174
• President's Rule in Arunachal Pradesh was set aside and the Congress government was restored

Significance: Established that the Governor's discretionary powers are narrowly defined and cannot be used to destabilise elected governments.

2. Uttarakhand Floor Test Case (Harish Rawat v. Union of India, 2016)

The Supreme Court directed that a floor test be conducted in the Uttarakhand assembly, reinforcing that the Governor cannot recommend President's Rule without allowing the government to demonstrate its majority on the floor of the House.

3. Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974) — Foundation Case

Seven-judge Constitution Bench (CJI A.N. Ray + 6 others). Held that the President AND Governor are constitutional heads who must act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers in nearly all matters. Discretion is the exception, not the rule. This is the foundational case on Article 163 — the Governor's discretionary powers are narrowly construed.

4. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) — President's Rule

Nine-judge Constitution Bench. Held that the President's satisfaction under Article 356 (on a Governor's report) is subject to judicial review. The floor of the House is the only test of majority — the Governor's subjective satisfaction cannot determine a government's strength. Secularism is part of basic structure. This is the single most important judgment on Centre-State relations and the Governor's role in Art 356.

5. Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India (Bihar Dissolution, 2006)

Five-judge Constitution Bench, 3:2 majority. The Court held that the Governor's report (recommending dissolution of the Bihar Assembly in 2005) was mala fide — based on speculation about "horse-trading" rather than facts. SC held a Governor's report cannot be relied upon if mala fide; this was the first case to strike down a proclamation under Art 356 on this ground.

6. B.P. Singhal v. Union of India (2010) — Governor Removal

Five-judge Constitution Bench (CJI K.G. Balakrishnan + 4). Held that the President's "pleasure" under Article 156 to remove a Governor is NOT entirely insulated from judicial review. While the President need not give reasons, the power cannot be exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, or for extraneous political reasons — there must be compelling reasons grounded in public interest.

7. State of Punjab v. Principal Secretary to the Governor (10 November 2023)

Three-judge bench (CJI D.Y. Chandrachud + Justices J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra). Held that the constitutional scheme does NOT permit a pocket veto or absolute veto by the Governor under Article 200. If the Governor withholds assent, he must remit the Bill to the Legislature for reconsideration — he cannot stall indefinitely. This case laid the foundation for the April 2025 TN Governor ruling.

8. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (2025)

Judgment date: 8 April 2025

Background: The Tamil Nadu Government approached the Supreme Court in October 2023 challenging Governor R.N. Ravi's inaction on 12 Bills passed between January 2020 and April 2023. On 13 November 2023, the Governor withheld assent to 10 bills and reserved 2 for the President's consideration.

Supreme Court's ruling:

• There is no concept of "pocket veto" or "absolute veto" under Article 200
• The Governor has only three options — give assent, return the bill, or reserve for President
• The Governor cannot indefinitely sit on bills without acting; prescribed timelines — 1 month for actions on CoM advice, 3 months for actions contrary to CoM advice
• Exercising powers under Article 142, the Supreme Court declared 10 pending bills as deemed to have received assent — an extraordinary constitutional remedy (the first time bills became law without formal assent)

Significance: The most decisive SC ruling at the time on the Governor's role in the legislative process — subsequently significantly modified by the November 2025 Presidential Reference Advisory Opinion.

Sarkaria Commission (1983) Recommendations

The Sarkaria Commission was constituted in June 1983 by the Government of India under Justice R.S. Sarkaria. It submitted its report in 1988 containing 247 recommendations on Centre-State relations.

On Governor's appointment:

• Governor should be appointed by a committee comprising the Prime Minister, Home Minister, Speaker of Lok Sabha, and Chief Minister of the concerned state
• The person should be from outside the state
• Must be a person who has not taken an active part in politics recently
• Should not be a member of the ruling party at the Centre

On Governor's powers:

• Discretionary powers should be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances
• Governor should not have a role in day-to-day administration
• In appointing CM, the Governor should first invite the leader of the largest party/alliance in the assembly

Punchhi Commission (2010) Recommendations

The Punchhi Commission on Centre-State Relations was constituted in April 2007 under Justice M.M. Punchhi, former Chief Justice of India. It submitted its seven-volume report in March 2010 with 273 recommendations.

On Governor's tenure and removal:

• Governor should be given a fixed tenure of five years — he should not be removed arbitrarily before the expiry of tenure
• Removal should be through a process of impeachment by the State Legislature (similar to the President's impeachment)
• The practice of treating Governors as "political football" must stop

On discretionary powers:

• The Governor should give his decision on a Bill within six months of its receipt — the commission recommended prescribing a time limit
• The appointment process should be made more transparent and consultative

Key criticism: The Punchhi Commission noted that Governors were frequently changed when a new government came to power at the Centre, undermining the office's neutrality.

Summary: Governor's Discretionary Powers at a Glance

Previous Year Questions (PYQs)

Prelims — Verified from BharatNotes' PYQ Datasets

Mains GS-2 — Verified from BharatNotes' PYQ Datasets

• 2022 (15 marks) — "Discuss the essential conditions for exercise of the legislative powers by the Governor and the legality of re-promulgation of ordinances by the Governor without placing them before the Legislature." → Article 213, D.C. Wadhwa 1987, Krishna Kumar Singh 2017 — GS2 2022 Q2
• 2018 (15 marks) — "Whether the Supreme Court judgement (July 2018) can settle the political tussle between the Lt. Governor and the elected Government of Delhi?" → Art 239AA, GNCTD v UOI 2018 — GS2 2018 Q11
• 2017 (15 marks) — "How does the role of the Governor create difficulties for Centre-State relations?" (Sarkaria, Punchhi; Bommai 1994; concerns about partisan appointments)

Note: The chapter previously listed Mains 2014, 2016, and 2022 questions on Governor that could not be independently verified in BharatNotes' verified PYQ database; the above three Mains questions are the verified ones. If you encounter the "agent of the Centre" or "grey area" Mains stems elsewhere, treat them as drill questions, not verified UPSC PYQs.

Recent Developments (2024–2026)

Tamil Nadu Governor Case — SC Deems Bills as Law Under Article 142 (April 2025)

In State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (8 April 2025), the Supreme Court (Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan) invoked Article 142 to deem 10 Bills as having received assent. The chronology: TN Assembly had passed 12 bills between 13 January 2020 and 28 April 2023; on 13 November 2023, Governor R.N. Ravi withheld assent to some and reserved others for Presidential consideration; after the bills were re-passed by the Assembly, the SC's April 2025 ruling declared 10 of them deemed assented. This was the first time in Indian constitutional history that bills became law without the formal assent of the Governor or President.

The two-judge bench also held that Governors must act within a reasonable time on bills; pocket veto (indefinite withholding without action) is constitutionally impermissible. It prescribed timelines: 1 month for actions on Council of Ministers' advice and 3 months for actions contrary to such advice.

UPSC angle: Prelims — Tamil Nadu Governor case 8 April 2025 (Justices J.B. Pardiwala + R. Mahadevan, 2-judge bench); Article 142 invoked; first bills deemed as law in Indian history; 10 bills deemed assented (2 had been reserved for President); subsequently the November 2025 Advisory Opinion (2025 INSC 1333) overruled the "deemed assent" remedy and prescribed timelines but did NOT overturn the principle that indefinite inaction is impermissible. Mains — critically examine whether invoking Article 142 to deem bills as law is a legitimate constitutional remedy or judicial overreach; how did the November 2025 Advisory Opinion modify — rather than wholly reverse — the April 2025 Tamil Nadu judgment?

Presidential Reference on Governor's Powers — Constitution Bench Rules (November 2025)

Following the Tamil Nadu ruling, President Murmu filed a Presidential Reference under Article 143 on 13 May 2025 — the 16th Presidential Reference and the first on a Governor's bill-assent role. The reference contained 14 questions on Articles 200 and 201. The Supreme Court constituted a 5-judge Constitution Bench led by CJI B.R. Gavai (Justices Surya Kant, Vikram Nath, P.S. Narasimha, and A.S. Chandurkar) which delivered its Advisory Opinion on 20 November 2025 (citation: 2025 INSC 1333). The bench held:

• All three options under Article 200 are discretionary — the Governor is not bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers when acting on bills; this is a significant expansion of gubernatorial discretion compared to pre-2025 understanding
• Decisions under Articles 200 and 201 are NOT justiciable until after a law comes into force; courts cannot examine the contents of a bill or review the merits of the decision at a pre-enactment stage
• "Deemed assent" via Article 142 by a two-judge bench (April 2025 TN ruling) is impermissible — one constitutional authority cannot substitute the role and powers of another; violated separation of powers
• Governors cannot indefinitely withhold bills; prolonged, unexplained, indefinite inaction will invite limited judicial scrutiny (mandamus to act) — but courts cannot impose specific timelines and cannot deem bills as law
• The phrase "as soon as possible" in Article 200 cannot be converted into judicially mandated timelines

This ruling significantly modified the April 2025 Tamil Nadu judgment: overruled the "deemed assent" remedy and the prescribed 1-month/3-month timelines, while confirming that complete inaction remains unconstitutional.

UPSC angle: Prelims — Presidential Reference (Article 143); 16th Presidential Reference; 5-judge Constitution Bench Advisory Opinion of 20 November 2025 (2025 INSC 1333); all three Art 200 options are discretionary; Governor NOT bound by CoM advice on bills; OVERRULED April 2025 TN ruling on "deemed assent" and timelines; first Art 143 reference on a Governor's bill-assent role. Mains — analyse the November 2025 ruling's implications for Centre-State relations; does it expand gubernatorial discretion at the cost of legislative sovereignty? Compare with Bommai (1994) on Art 356 justiciability; contrast the pre-enactment non-justiciability under Arts 200/201 with the post-enactment justiciability under Art 356.

Governor R.N. Ravi Transferred to West Bengal — Gubernatorial Reshuffle (March 2026)

Tamil Nadu Governor R.N. Ravi (took charge 18 September 2021) had been in unprecedented public friction with the DMK government led by CM M.K. Stalin throughout 2023–2025. The Governor had refused to read parts of the Government's address, returned bills without action, and publicly contradicted the State Cabinet. In a nine-governor reshuffle announced on 6 March 2026, Ravi was transferred to West Bengal as Governor — NOT a recall but a lateral move that ended his turbulent Tamil Nadu tenure.

New TN Governor (additional charge): Rajendra Vishwanath Arlekar (Kerala Governor since January 2025) took additional charge of Tamil Nadu on 12 March 2026. A former Speaker of the Goa Assembly (2012–15) and Cabinet Minister in Goa (2015–17), Arlekar has earlier served as Governor of Himachal Pradesh and Bihar.

C.V. Ananda Bose (Governor of West Bengal from 17 November 2022) faced multiple controversies during his tenure, including sexual harassment allegations by Raj Bhavan staff in May 2024 (which he denied), and protracted disputes with CM Mamata Banerjee. He resigned on 5 March 2026 (via letter to the President, citing that "three and a half years is enough"). R.N. Ravi was appointed his successor on 6 March 2026, taking charge shortly after.

UPSC angle: Prelims — R.N. Ravi appointed WB Governor 6 March 2026 (lateral transfer, NOT recalled); Arlekar additional TN charge 12 March 2026; Bose resigned 5 March 2026; Governor holds office during pleasure of President (Article 156); reshuffle covered 9 Governors including Bihar, Nagaland, Telangana, Maharashtra, Himachal Pradesh. Mains — discuss the constitutional mechanisms for removing/transferring a Governor; assess whether transferring rather than removing R.N. Ravi signals the Centre's strategy of managing Governor-State conflicts; B.P. Singhal (2010) limits on arbitrary action.

West Bengal and Kerala — Governor-State Conflicts Continue (2024)

West Bengal approached the Supreme Court under Article 131 (original jurisdiction) in 2024, alleging CBI overreach in the state after withdrawal of general consent — raising federalism and Governor-related issues. Kerala challenged the President's withholding of assent for four bills in the Supreme Court, arguing that the combined action of the Governor (who held the bills without action for years) and the President (who then withheld assent) amounted to a constitutional veto.

The Kerala case was affected by the November 2025 constitutional developments. The 5-judge Constitution Bench Advisory of 20 November 2025 (Presidential Reference under Article 143, 2025 INSC 1333) held that "deemed assent" via Article 142 was impermissible and that decisions under Articles 200 and 201 are not justiciable pre-enactment — significantly limiting Kerala's judicial remedies. As of May 2026, Kerala's pending bills before the President remain legally contested, and the constitutional landscape is that Governors are not bound by CoM advice when acting under Article 200, courts cannot impose specific timelines, but "prolonged unexplained indefinite inaction" attracts limited judicial scrutiny (mandamus to act). Political accountability under Article 356 remains the primary check.

These cases collectively represent the most active period of Governor–State tension in Indian constitutional history since the S.R. Bommai era — significantly clarified but not fully resolved by the November 2025 Advisory Opinion.

UPSC angle: Prelims — Kerala's pending bills before President; Article 143 Presidential Reference (13 May 2025, 16th Presidential Reference); 5-judge Advisory Opinion 20 November 2025 (2025 INSC 1333) — Governor not bound by CoM advice under Art 200; no "deemed assent"; no judicial timelines; only "prolonged unexplained indefinite inaction" attracts limited scrutiny. Mains — evaluate the cumulative impact of multi-state Governor controversies on cooperative federalism; how does the November 2025 Advisory Opinion expand gubernatorial autonomy at the cost of state legislative sovereignty? Contrast with the pre-November 2025 understanding that the Governor must act on CoM advice except in narrow discretionary areas.

Exam Strategy

High-value topic for GS2 Mains. Questions typically ask you to analyse the Governor's role in Centre-State relations, evaluate discretionary power controversies, or discuss commission recommendations.

Key points to always mention:

• The dual nature of the Governor — constitutional head but also agent of the Centre (Sarkaria Commission view)
• Shamsher Singh (1974, 7-judge) — foundational; Governor must act on aid and advice except for narrow discretion
• Nabam Rebia (2016, 5-judge) — Governor's power over assembly sessions is NOT discretionary; must act on CoM advice
• TN Governor (April 2025, 2-judge) — no pocket veto; bills deemed assented by SC under Article 142; prescribed 1-month/3-month timelines (later significantly modified by Nov 2025 Advisory)
• Presidential Reference Advisory (November 2025, 5-judge Constitution Bench, 2025 INSC 1333) — OVERRULED "deemed assent" and judicially imposed timelines; held all three Art 200 options are Governor's discretion (not bound by CoM advice); decisions under Arts 200/201 not justiciable pre-enactment; only "prolonged unexplained inaction" attracts limited judicial scrutiny (mandamus, not deemed law)
• B.P. Singhal (2010) — removal of Governor cannot be arbitrary even though it's "pleasure of President"
• Bommai (1994, 9-judge) — floor of House is only test of majority; Art 356 judicially reviewable
• Sarkaria — transparent appointment via PM, HM, Speaker, and CM; non-political person; outside the state
• Punchhi — fixed 5-year tenure; removal by state legislature impeachment

Do not confuse (Rule C):

• Article 161 (Governor's pardon) vs Article 72 (President's pardon) — President can pardon death sentences and court martial cases; Governor cannot
• Article 200 (state bills, 3 options: assent/return/reserve — all Governor's discretion; money bills cannot be returned) vs Article 111 (Union bills, 3 options: assent/return/reserve — but President acts on CoM advice) — State Legislature's re-passing doesn't bind the President under Art 201; post-Nov 2025: Governor NOT bound by CoM advice under Art 200
• Article 213 (Governor ordinance) vs Article 123 (President ordinance) — Governor needs Presidential instructions for some subjects
• Sarkaria Commission (1983–88, 247 recommendations) vs Punchhi Commission (2007–10, 273 recommendations)
• Bommai 1994 (Art 356) vs B.P. Singhal 2010 (Art 156 removal) — both have judicial review but at different stages
• Nabam Rebia 2016 (summoning assembly) vs Shivraj Chouhan 2020 (floor test) — both limit Governor's discretion in different domains

Mains answer structure:

1. Constitutional position briefly (Arts 153, 154, 163)
2. Nature of discretionary powers — Article 163 analysis (constitutional vs situational)
3. Key controversies — floor test, bill withholding, Art 356 recommendations
4. SC case law chain: Shamsher Singh 1974 → Bommai 1994 → Rameshwar Prasad 2006 → Nabam Rebia 2016 → Singhal 2010 → Punjab 2023 → TN April 2025 (deemed assent, timelines) → Presidential Reference Advisory 20 Nov 2025 (2025 INSC 1333 — overruled deemed assent/timelines; Art 200 fully discretionary; not bound by CoM advice)
5. Commission recommendations (Sarkaria, Punchhi)
6. Way forward — depoliticisation, accountability, fixed tenure