Energy Security — India's Oil, Gas, Coal & Renewable Transition

Introduction

Energy security — the uninterrupted availability of energy at an affordable price — is a strategic imperative for India's economic growth and geopolitical sovereignty. India is the world's third-largest energy consumer (after China and the USA), with energy demand growing rapidly alongside industrialisation and rising living standards.

Key tension: India needs cheap energy for development while simultaneously committed to climate targets under the Paris Agreement. Managing this transition is the central energy policy challenge.

India's Energy Profile

India achieved 50% non-fossil capacity (as a share of total installed capacity) in June 2025 — five years ahead of the NDC target. By 31 March 2026, non-fossil share had risen further to 53.15% (283.46 GW of 533 GW total).

Oil and Gas Sector

Import Dependence and Vulnerability

India imports approximately 85% of its crude oil requirements, making the economy vulnerable to global price shocks. Over 60% of oil imports come from the Middle East (Gulf), creating geographic concentration risk.

Major oil import sources: Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Russia (increased sharply post-2022 Ukraine war), UAE, USA.

Upstream Sector (Exploration & Production)

Downstream Sector (Refining & Distribution)

Challenges in Oil & Gas

• High fiscal subsidy burden on LPG and kerosene (though direct benefit transfer reformed LPG subsidies)
• Gas infrastructure underdeveloped; gas share in primary energy ~6% vs world average ~24%
• ONGC declining production from ageing fields; difficult to attract FDI for deep-water exploration
• City Gas Distribution (CGD) network being expanded under PNGRB

Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR)

India maintains emergency crude oil reserves to cushion against supply disruptions.

• Managed by ISPRL (Indian Strategic Petroleum Reserves Limited), a SPV under MoPNG
• Total SPR provides approximately 9.5 days of consumption cover
• India also has commercial stocks — combined total gives ~74 days
• International Energy Agency (IEA) recommendation: 90 days' cover (India is now an IEA associate)
• Phase II expansion: additional locations planned but stalled due to funding constraints

Coal Sector

Dominance and Scale

Coal remains India's dominant energy source, accounting for about 69% of electricity generation and ~55% of primary energy. India crossed 1 billion tonnes of coal production in FY 2024-25 for the second consecutive year, reaching 1,047.57 MT. In FY 2025-26, CIL production reached 768.1 MT (marginal dip of 1.7% from FY25's 781.1 MT), while captive and commercial mines set a record of 210.46 MT (+10.2% YoY); all-India FY26 target is 1,157 MT.

Coal India Limited (CIL)

• World's largest coal producer
• Navratna PSU under Ministry of Coal
• Has 7 wholly-owned coal mining subsidiaries
• CIL is also setting up 3,000 MW of renewable energy for its own mining operations

The Coal Import Paradox

Despite being the 2nd largest coal producer, India imports coal for:

• Power plants (due to high ash content of domestic coal for super-critical plants)
• Steel sector (coking coal — India has limited coking coal reserves)
• Coastal power plants (imported coal cheaper than inland freight for domestic coal)

Just Energy Transition

• India committed to transition away from coal as part of COP26 commitments (with caveats)
• JETP (Just Energy Transition Partnership): India in discussions; no formal deal signed as of March 2026 (unlike South Africa, Indonesia, Vietnam which signed)
• Key concern: coal employs over 2 million workers directly and millions indirectly; abrupt phase-down risks social disruption
• Planned Coal Mines Closure Policy and just transition funds being discussed

Renewable Energy

500 GW Target by 2030

India's NDC commits to 500 GW of installed non-fossil fuel capacity (RE + nuclear) by 2030.

Government plans: 50 GW of RE bids per year from FY 2023-24 to FY 2027-28 (including ≥10 GW wind annually).

Solar Energy

Wind Energy

• India: 4th largest wind power capacity globally
• Onshore wind target: 100+ GW by 2030
• Offshore wind: policy announced; Tamil Nadu and Gujarat have highest potential
• Challenges: land acquisition, grid integration, RPO compliance

Hydropower

• India has ~51.41 GW of large hydropower (March 2026, CEA); ~56.58 GW including small hydro (5.17 GW small hydro)
• Large hydro classified as renewable since 2019 (reversed earlier policy)
• Pumped Storage Hydro (PSH): key energy storage solution; 63 GW potential identified

Green Hydrogen

National Green Hydrogen Mission (2023)

• Approved by Cabinet on January 4, 2023
• Initial outlay: ₹19,744 crore
• Target: produce at least 5 MMT (million metric tonnes) of green hydrogen per annum by 2030
• Associated renewable energy addition: ~125 GW
• Expected investment: over ₹8 lakh crore; 6 lakh jobs

SIGHT Programme

Strategic Interventions for Green Hydrogen Transition (SIGHT):

• Outlay: ₹17,490 crore
• Component I: PLI for electrolyser manufacturing (₹4,440 crore) — target: 1.5 GW/year capacity
• Component II: Incentives for green hydrogen production (₹13,050 crore)
• Duration: 5 years for electrolyser; 3 years for production incentives

Green Hydrogen Potential

India has competitive advantage: abundant solar/wind potential, existing refinery and fertiliser infrastructure that could switch to green hydrogen. Target sectors: fertilisers, steel, shipping, heavy transport.

Nuclear Energy

Three-Stage Nuclear Programme

• Stage 1: Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs) using natural uranium (U-235)
• Stage 2: Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs) using plutonium-239 from Stage 1 spent fuel; prototype at Kalpakkam
• Stage 3: Advanced Heavy Water Reactors using thorium-232 (India has world's largest thorium reserves — ~25% of global, per DAE/government sources; USGS 2025 also ranks India #1)

SHANTI Act, 2025: The entire nuclear legal framework changed with the SHANTI (Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India) Act, 2025, which received Presidential assent on December 20, 2025. It replaces the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLNDA), 2010. Key changes: (1) private Indian companies, JVs, and foreign entities may now own and operate nuclear power plants; (2) supplier liability (the CLNDA Section 17(b) barrier that blocked Westinghouse and Framatome) is removed; (3) AERB gains statutory independence; (4) operator liability capped by plant capacity. This is the single most significant nuclear policy reform since Independence.

DISCOMS Crisis

Distribution companies (DISCOMs) are the last-mile entities connecting consumers to the grid — and the weakest link.

Problems

RDSS Scheme (Revamped Distribution Sector Scheme)

• Launched: July 2021
• Outlay: ₹3,03,758 crore (GBS: ₹97,631 crore from Centre)
• Targets: Reduce AT&C losses to 12-15% pan-India; ACS-ARR gap to zero by 2024-25
• Key components: Prepaid Smart Metering (20.46 crore consumer meters sanctioned); System Metering; Distribution infrastructure upgrade
• Duration: FY 2021-22 to FY 2025-26

International Solar Alliance (ISA)

• India's initiative, co-founded with France; launched at COP21 Paris (2015)
• Secretariat: Gurugram, India
• Membership: 120 signatory countries / 107 full members (as of August 2025; US announced withdrawal on 7 January 2026)
• Objective: Mobilise $1 trillion in solar investments by 2030; 1,000 GW solar across member nations
• Treaty-based international organisation since 2017

CDRI (Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure)

• Launched by India at UN Secretary General's Climate Action Summit, September 2019
• Promotes resilient infrastructure in climate-vulnerable nations
• Membership: 50 member countries and 10 international organisations (as of 2025; target: 75 countries / 25 organisations by 2026)
• Secretariat: New Delhi
• Special Initiative: Infrastructure for Resilient Island States (IRIS)

India's NDC and Climate Commitments

India's updated NDC (2022):

India's 2035 NDC (submitted 2025): India submitted its next NDC for 2031–2035 with enhanced targets aligned with Viksit Bharat 2047 goals.

Energy Storage

Previous Year Questions (PYQs)

Prelims

1. (UPSC 2016) The term 'IndARC' sometimes seen in the news, is the name of: (A) An indigenously developed radar system; (B) India's satellite to provide services to the countries of Indian Ocean Rim; (C) A scientific establishment set up by India in Arctic region; (D) India's underwater observatory to scientifically study the Arctic Ocean.

2. (UPSC 2018) Consider the following statements about 'the International Solar Alliance': 1. ISA is an alliance of solar resource rich countries lying fully or partially between Tropic of Cancer and Tropic of Capricorn. 2. It is a treaty-based inter-governmental organisation. Which is/are correct?

3. (UPSC 2020) In India, the 'National Clean Energy Fund' is used for funding/promoting: (A) Clean energy projects in rural India; (B) Research and development in new and renewable energy sector; (C) International agreements on climate change; (D) Nuclear power projects

4. (UPSC 2022) Consider the following: 1. Biomass combustion 2. Hydroelectric power 3. Solar power. These are examples of which type of energy?

Mains

1. (UPSC 2013, GS3) What do you understand by 'coalbed methane' and 'shale gas'? How do they differ from each other? What is India's approach to develop these energy resources?

2. (UPSC 2016, GS3) Critically examine the success of India's renewable energy programme in the context of the targets set in Nationally Determined Contributions under the Paris Agreement.

3. (UPSC 2020, GS3) How is science and technology contributing to energy security in India? Discuss the role of renewable energy in India's energy mix with specific reference to solar energy.

4. (UPSC 2023, GS3) 'Green Hydrogen' is being touted as a clean fuel of the future. What are the challenges to its mass adoption? What is India's National Green Hydrogen Mission?

Cross-paper relevance

• GS3 — Indian Economy (primary) — Oil import dependence, strategic petroleum reserves, coal transition, 500 GW renewable target by 2030, green hydrogen, PM Surya Ghar, energy mix
• GS3 — Environment — Climate commitments, NDC targets, coal phase-down, carbon footprint of energy sector
• GS2 — International Relations: energy diplomacy, oil geopolitics, India-Gulf relations, India-Russia oil trade
• Essay — "India's energy security dilemma: between fossil fuel dependency and clean energy ambition"; "Green hydrogen: next frontier or distant dream?"

Recent Developments (2024–2026)

500 GW by 2030 — Is India on Track? The Math and the Structural Gaps

(Renewable capacity data — 283.46 GW non-fossil (March 2026), 53.15% non-fossil share, solar 150.26 GW, wind 56.09 GW, FY26 record 55.29 GW non-fossil addition, solar module capacity 74 GW — is covered in the "Renewable Energy — 500 GW Target" and "India's Energy Profile" sections above. This section analyses why the remaining ~217 GW to 2030 is structurally different from the first 283 GW.)

India added a record 55.29 GW of non-fossil capacity in FY26 — nearly doubling FY25's 29.5 GW. Non-fossil capacity has reached 283.46 GW (31 March 2026). The 500 GW target by 2030 now requires adding ~217 GW more in ~4 years, implying ~54 GW/year — a pace India has now demonstrated once (FY26). Three structural gaps explain why sustaining this pace is harder than achieving it once:

The generation vs. capacity gap: Solar constitutes 50% of renewable capacity but only 15-16% of actual electricity generation — because solar plants operate at 20-25% capacity utilisation (the sun doesn't shine at night). Coal, at 48% of capacity, generates 72-75% of electricity. This means India's 500 GW target, even if achieved, does not eliminate coal dependency in generation terms without large-scale storage.

The storage binding constraint: Grid-scale battery storage is the critical missing link. India had only ~3 GW of utility-scale battery storage as of March 2025. The Central Electricity Authority estimates India needs 47 GW of battery storage by 2030 for stable grid integration of 500 GW renewables. Current storage procurement under BESS tenders is approximately 6-8 GW committed — a significant shortfall. Until storage scales, RE additions beyond 40% grid share create curtailment and grid stability risks.

The solar manufacturing self-sufficiency test: India's 74 GW module manufacturing capacity (March 2025) is now sufficient for domestic deployment and modest exports. However, domestic cell and wafer production capacity is far lower (~10-12 GW), making module-level self-sufficiency partially dependent on Chinese cell imports. The Approved List of Models and Manufacturers (ALMM) and ISTS waiver policies are designed to gradually close this gap.

UPSC angle: India's FY26 record of 55.29 GW non-fossil addition (proving the ~54 GW/year pace is achievable), storage gap (3 GW actual vs 47 GW needed), the generation-vs-capacity distinction (solar = ~28% of capacity, 15-16% of generation), and the solar manufacturing self-sufficiency gap (cells/wafers still import-dependent) are Mains GS3 analytical arguments for "critically evaluate India's 500 GW renewable energy target by 2030."

Russia as India's Top Crude Oil Supplier — Energy Geopolitics

Following the Russia-Ukraine war (February 2022), India dramatically increased its import of discounted Russian crude oil. By FY 2024-25, Russia accounted for ~35.8% of India's total crude oil imports — the largest single source — with the value of Russian crude imports rising from $1.1 billion (pre-war) to ~$50.2 billion. Previously, Russia supplied less than 2% of India's oil (before 2022). Iraq (15%), Saudi Arabia (13%), and UAE (10%) were the other major suppliers.

FY 2025-26 shift: Russia's share fell sharply in the second half of FY26. Russia made up approximately 31.5% of India's crude imports (April–December FY26), then declined to below 25% for the first time in two years between December 2025 and February 2026, falling to ~21.4% (1.36 mbpd) in December 2025 and ~19.4% (1.10 mbpd) in January 2026 (Vortexa Analytics). The decline was driven by US sanctions targeting Rosneft and Lukoil (late 2025) and a 25% US punitive tariff on Indian exports creating diplomatic pressure, rather than a deliberate policy reorientation by India. Iraq and Saudi Arabia partially filled the gap.

India's pragmatic "strategic autonomy" approach — buying cheap Russian crude while maintaining Western partnerships — has been both economically rational (saving billions in import costs) and diplomatically tested. India has primarily paid for Russian crude in UAE Dirhams and Indian Rupees through intermediaries, reducing dollar transaction exposure.

UPSC angle: Russia's share trajectory — ~35.8% in FY25 → declining below 25% by early 2026 — illustrates how geopolitics (US sanctions, tariff pressure) can shift even a commercially-driven energy relationship. The "strategic autonomy" doctrine under pressure, and the energy-diplomacy nexus, are Mains GS2 (India's foreign policy) and GS3 (energy security) analytical themes.

Green Hydrogen — Cost Trajectory, Electrolyser Ecosystem, and the Race India Cannot Afford to Lose

(Mission outlay data — Rs. 19,744 crore, SIGHT Rs. 17,490 crore, 5 MMT target by 2030 — is covered in the "National Green Hydrogen Mission" section above. This section analyses the cost economics, competitive landscape, and why mission success is not assured.)

The cost problem — $4-6/kg vs $2/kg: India's green hydrogen production cost ranges from $4-6/kg (2025), compared to grey hydrogen (from natural gas) at ~$1-1.5/kg. The mission's viability depends on reaching $2/kg by 2030 — requiring three simultaneous cost reductions: (1) renewable electricity cost falling to Rs. 1.5-2/kWh (from current Rs. 2.5-3/kWh for dedicated RE for GH), (2) electrolyser capex falling from ~$700-1,000/kW to $300-400/kW, and (3) compression and storage infrastructure scale-up. The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) projects $1.5-2/kg globally by 2030 — achievable only in best-solar-resource locations. India's Rajasthan and Gujarat have the resource endowment; the infrastructure and financing gap is the variable.

Electrolyser — the manufacturing gap India must close: SIGHT's Component I (Rs. 4,440 crore) specifically incentivises domestic electrolyser manufacturing — India currently has minimal domestic production, importing mostly from Germany (Thyssenkrupp Uhde), Norway (Nel), and China (Peric). SECI has concluded both tranches of SIGHT Component I, awarding 3,000 MW (3 GW)/year of electrolyser manufacturing capacity to 15 companies — with cumulative 5-year sales of up to 15 GW by 2030 (SECI, 2025). Indian players include L&T Electrolyser, Reliance Electrolyser Manufacturing, Waaree Energies, Ohmium, Matrix Gas & Renewables, and others. This is India's PLI-style bet in the green hydrogen value chain.

International competition — Middle East and Australia: Saudi Arabia (NEOM's Helios project), the UAE (Abu Dhabi's Masdar), and Australia (Pilbara Green Hydrogen) are all targeting sub-$2/kg production with sovereign wealth fund backing and superior solar irradiance or natural gas proximity. India's competitive advantage is its large captive industrial demand (fertiliser plants, refineries, steel) which reduces export dependency risk. But without cost parity by 2030, India risks becoming a green hydrogen importer rather than the exporter the mission targets.

UPSC angle: The $4-6/kg vs $2/kg cost gap, electrolyser manufacturing gap (SIGHT Component I, 5 GW/year target), India's captive industrial demand as competitive moat, and the international green hydrogen race (Middle East/Australia competition) are Mains GS3 analytical arguments for "assess the prospects of India's National Green Hydrogen Mission."

Nuclear Energy — Why SMRs, What the Civil Liability Barrier Is, and the 100 GW Math

(Nuclear capacity data — Rs. 20,000 crore Budget 2025-26 allocation, 5 SMRs by 2033, ~8,780 MW current capacity, three-stage programme, SHANTI Act 2025 — is covered in the "Nuclear Energy" section above. This section analyses the SMR rationale, how SHANTI resolves the civil liability barrier, and why 100 GW by 2047 is now structurally feasible.)

Why SMRs rather than conventional large reactors: Traditional pressurised water reactors (PWRs) or PHWRs cost ₹12,000-15,000 crore per GW and take 10-15 years to build (Kudankulam units 3/4 are case studies in construction delay). SMRs (50-300 MW, factory-manufactured) offer: (1) modular deployment matching demand growth, (2) 5-7 year construction timeline, (3) siting flexibility near industrial clusters requiring firm power, and (4) load-following capability (SMRs can ramp up/down to balance intermittent RE). For India's 2031-32 target of 22,480 MW — adding ~13,600 MW in 7 years — SMRs are the only viable path given the constraints on large-reactor lead times.

SHANTI Act, 2025 — The Civil Liability Barrier Resolved: The SHANTI (Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India) Act, 2025 received Presidential assent in late 2025, replacing both the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the CLNDA, 2010. The critical change: Section 17(b) of CLNDA — which allowed NPCIL (the operator) to recourse against equipment suppliers in case of accidents, deterring Westinghouse (AP1000), GE-Hitachi, and Framatome from signing technology agreements — is removed. The SHANTI Act channels liability entirely to the operator, in line with the Vienna and Paris Conventions. This ends the deadlock that blocked India-US nuclear commerce since the 2008 civil nuclear deal. The Act also allows private Indian companies, JVs, and foreign entities to build and operate nuclear plants — ending NPCIL's monopoly — and grants AERB statutory independence. Foreign players like Holtec International have already indicated interest.

The 100 GW by 2047 Math — Now Structurally Feasible: Under the old framework, India's trajectory (600 MW/year from NPCIL alone) would reach only ~20-25 GW by 2047. Under SHANTI: private operators can build; technology imports from Westinghouse, EDF, and others are unblocked; SMR partnerships (IAEA-certified designs available from 2026+) can be fast-tracked. The 100 GW target requires approximately 15-20 large-scale reactors plus 50+ SMRs — feasible over 20 years with multiple operators. The remaining uncertainty is land acquisition, cooling water availability, and public acceptance (notably post-Fukushima concerns).

UPSC angle for 2026-27: The SHANTI Act 2025 (replacing Atomic Energy Act 1962 + CLNDA 2010), removal of CLNDA Section 17(b) supplier liability, private sector entry (ending NPCIL monopoly), AERB statutory status, and the consequent unlock for India-US nuclear commerce are the key new Prelims and Mains GS3 nuclear policy facts. Replace the old framing ("CLNDA as barrier") with the new framing ("SHANTI as unlock") in all answers.

Exam Strategy

High-yield for Prelims:

• SPR: 3 locations (Visakhapatnam, Mangaluru, Padur), 5.33 MMT total, 9.5 days cover
• National Green Hydrogen Mission: Jan 2023, 5 MMT target, ₹19,744 crore outlay
• SIGHT: ₹17,490 crore; Component I (electrolyser PLI, ₹4,440 crore) — 3,000 MW/year capacity awarded to 15 companies (SECI, 2025); cumulative 15 GW by 2030
• ISA: India-France initiative, Gurugram HQ, treaty-based since 2017; 120 signatory countries / 107 full members (Aug 2025); US withdrawal announced Jan 2026
• CDRI: India's initiative, 2019, secretariat New Delhi; 50 member countries + 10 international organisations (2025)
• NDC: 45% emissions intensity reduction by 2030; 50% non-fossil electricity (achieved June 2025, 5 years early); net-zero 2070; India's 2035 NDC submitted 2025
• RDSS: AT&C loss target 12-15%, ₹3.03 lakh crore outlay
• SHANTI Act, 2025 — replaces Atomic Energy Act 1962 + CLNDA 2010; allows private/foreign nuclear operators; removes Section 17(b) supplier liability; grants AERB statutory status
• Total installed power capacity: ~533 GW (March 2026); non-fossil: 283.46 GW (53.15%)
• Solar: 150.26 GW (March 2026); Wind: 56.09 GW (March 2026)

For Mains (GS3):

• Use the trilemma framework: Energy Security + Affordability + Sustainability
• India's dependence on coal for base load vs renewable intermittency — need storage
• Just Transition argument: coal sector employment vs climate targets
• Link PM Surya Ghar Yojana to energy democratisation (prosumers)
• Three-stage nuclear programme as long-term energy security (thorium angle)
• DISCOMS as the Achilles heel of the energy sector — reforms essential for RE integration

Mnemonics:

• SPR locations: Visakhapatnam + Mangaluru + Padur = VMP (Very Major Pipeline)
• SIGHT components: Electrolyser manufacturing + Production of green hydrogen

Key Terms

Captive Power

• Definition: Captive power refers to electricity generated by a plant set up by a person, co-operative society or association of persons primarily for their own use rather than for commercial sale, as defined under Section 2(8) of the Electricity Act, 2003.
• Context: Energy-intensive industries such as steel, cement, aluminium, chemicals and textiles set up captive power plants (CPPs) to secure reliable, cost-effective electricity and insulate themselves from grid outages and high industrial tariffs. The Electricity Act, 2003 liberalised this space: Section 9 allows any person to construct, maintain and operate a captive generating plant and dedicated transmission lines without a licence, while Rule 3 of the Electricity Rules, 2005 lays down the twin qualifying criteria of at least 26% ownership and at least 51% annual consumption by captive users. India's captive capacity stood at roughly 80,926 MW (about 80.9 GW) as per CEA's General Review 2025.
• UPSC Relevance: Captive power is a foundational GS3 economy-infrastructure concept that underpins Prelims questions on the Electricity Act 2003, open access, cross-subsidy surcharge and power-sector reforms, and Mains questions on DISCOM finances, industrial competitiveness and energy security. No specific PYQ is cited here; however, the term family — power-sector regulation, electricity pricing and grid reforms — recurs regularly in UPSC papers. Aspirants should remember the 26% ownership/51% consumption rule and the surcharge exemptions, as these are classic factual hooks.

Strategic Petroleum Reserve

• Definition: A Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) is an emergency stockpile of crude oil maintained by a country to cushion against supply disruptions, price shocks, or geopolitical crises; in India it is built and operated by Indian Strategic Petroleum Reserves Limited (ISPRL) in underground rock caverns.
• Context: India imports the bulk of its crude oil (import dependence around 88% in FY2024-25), making it acutely vulnerable to global supply shocks, which is why it began building strategic reserves after the early-2000s policy decision. The International Energy Agency (IEA) recommends member countries hold oil stocks equal to at least 90 days of net imports; India, an IEA Associate Member (since 2017), is not legally bound by this but uses it as a benchmark. Phase I of India's SPR programme created 5.33 million tonnes of underground storage across three coastal sites, with a larger Phase II under development.
• UPSC Relevance: This is a high-yield GS3 (energy security, economy) and GS2 (international relations, IEA) topic. Prelims testing typically targets ISPRL's three Phase-I locations (Visakhapatnam, Mangaluru, Padur), the storage method (underground rock caverns), the operating entity (ISPRL, a subsidiary of the Oil Industry Development Board), and the IEA 90-day benchmark. Mains framing centres on energy security, reducing import vulnerability, and strategic autonomy. This is a foundational concept underpinning questions on the topic family of energy security, oil import dependence, and the rupee-dollar/current-account impact of crude prices. (No verified PYQ is cited here.)

Coal Block Auctions

• Definition: Coal block auctions are the competitive, transparent process by which the Government of India allocates coal mines to public and private companies through e-bidding, under the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Act, 2015 and the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 — replacing the earlier discretionary "Screening Committee" allocation system struck down by the Supreme Court.
• Context: Until 2014, coal blocks were allocated administratively to companies for captive end-use, a system the CAG's 2012 report flagged for causing a notional loss of ₹1.86 lakh crore to the exchequer (the "Coalgate" controversy). In Manohar Lal Sharma v. Principal Secretary (judgment 25 Aug 2014; order 24 Sep 2014), the Supreme Court declared all allocations made since 1993 through the Screening Committee and government-dispensation route illegal and arbitrary, cancelling 204 of 218 blocks. To re-allocate these mines transparently, the government enacted the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Act, 2015 (notified 30 Mar 2015), and later opened the sector to commercial mining with 100% FDI from 18 June 2020.
• UPSC Relevance: This is a foundational GS3 topic on the economy (infrastructure, energy security) and governance, and underpins Prelims and Mains questions on natural-resource allocation, the doctrine of public trust, and transparency in public auctions. The Supreme Court's 2014 verdict is also significant for GS2 (judicial review, executive accountability) and links to the 2G/spectrum line of cases establishing that scarce natural resources should ordinarily be allocated through competitive bidding. Aspirants should be able to distinguish captive allocation from commercial mining and explain the shift from discretionary allotment to revenue-share auctions.

Green Hydrogen Mission

• Definition: The National Green Hydrogen Mission is a Government of India programme approved on 4 January 2023 with an initial outlay of ₹19,744 crore, aimed at making India a global hub for the production, use and export of green hydrogen — hydrogen produced by electrolysis of water using renewable energy — and targeting 5 million tonnes (MMT) of annual green hydrogen production by 2030.
• Context: Hydrogen is termed "green" only when produced from renewable electricity, distinguishing it from "grey" hydrogen (from natural gas) and "blue" hydrogen (from fossil fuels with carbon capture). India imports a large share of its energy, and hard-to-abate sectors such as refining, fertilisers, steel and long-haul transport are difficult to decarbonise through direct electrification, making green hydrogen central to India's net-zero-by-2070 pledge. The Mission is implemented by the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE), with the Solar Energy Corporation of India (SECI) as the implementing agency for its incentive schemes.
• UPSC Relevance: This is a foundational GS3 concept under energy security, infrastructure and environment, and recurs in current-affairs-linked questions on India's energy transition and net-zero commitments. For Prelims, aspirants should know the approval year (2023), the lead ministry (MNRE), the 2030 production target (5 MMT), and the Green Hydrogen Standard emission threshold. For Mains, it underpins answers on decarbonising hard-to-abate sectors, reducing fossil-fuel import dependence, and India's climate diplomacy — and connects to the Essay theme of sustainable development. No verified direct PYQ exists for this specific term; it underpins question families on renewable energy, climate change mitigation and energy security.

Renewable Energy Targets (India)

• Definition: Renewable Energy Targets (India) are the quantified national goals for expanding non-fossil-based electricity capacity — most prominently the pledge to reach 500 GW of installed non-fossil-fuel power capacity by 2030 and to source about 50% of cumulative installed electricity capacity from non-fossil sources, as committed under India's COP26 "Panchamrit" announcement and updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC).
• Context: India's renewable energy targets evolved from its first NDC (2015), which pledged about 40% non-fossil installed capacity by 2030, to the updated NDC submitted to the UNFCCC on 26 August 2022, which raised this to about 50% and committed to a 45% cut in GDP emissions intensity (from 2005 levels) by 2030. These flow from Prime Minister Modi's five-fold "Panchamrit" pledge at COP26 (Glasgow, 2021), which set a 500 GW non-fossil capacity goal by 2030 and net-zero by 2070. On 25 March 2026 the Union Cabinet approved a fresh NDC for 2031-2035, enhancing the ambition to 60% non-fossil installed capacity and a 47% emissions-intensity cut by 2035. "Non-fossil" here includes renewables (solar, wind, hydro, bio) plus nuclear.
• UPSC Relevance: This is a foundational GS3 concept that underpins the energy, climate-change and sustainable-development question families across both Prelims and Mains. Prelims frequently tests factual recall — the 500 GW figure, the COP26 Panchamrit pledges, the NDC percentages, India's global ranking, and the distinction between "non-fossil" (includes nuclear) and "renewable" capacity. Mains GS3 frames it analytically: India's energy transition, energy security versus climate commitments, financing renewables, and grid integration; it also crosses into GS2 (climate diplomacy, Paris Agreement obligations) and Essay (sustainable development themes). Note the common confusion-pair: the 500 GW target is "non-fossil," whereas the 50%/60% targets refer to "non-fossil share of cumulative installed capacity" — not generation share.

Energy Security and Strategic Reserves

• Definition: Energy security is the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price, while strategic reserves are government-controlled emergency stocks of crude oil (and other fuels) held to cushion the economy against supply disruptions, price shocks, or geopolitical interruptions.
• Context: For India, the world's third-largest oil consumer and importer, energy security is acute because crude oil import dependence reached 87.7% in 2023-24 (PPAC), exposing the economy to global price volatility and supply risks. To build a buffer, the government created Indian Strategic Petroleum Reserves Limited (ISPRL) on 16 June 2004, and under Phase I built underground rock-cavern storage of 5.33 million metric tonnes (MMT) at Visakhapatnam, Mangalore and Padur. India, an Associate Member of the International Energy Agency (IEA) since 2017, broadly aspires toward the IEA norm of holding oil stocks equal to 90 days of net imports.
• UPSC Relevance: This is a foundational GS3 concept under "energy" and "infrastructure" that underpins recurring questions on import dependence, the rupee-dollar/current-account impact of oil prices, and supply-chain resilience. In Prelims it is tested factually — ISPRL's storage locations, the IEA's 90-day stock norm, and India's IEA associate status. In Mains (GS3) it appears in analytical framing: how strategic reserves, diversification of import sources, the energy transition and domestic exploration together advance energy security, and how oil shocks transmit to inflation and the fiscal position.